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The struggle of (humans) against power is the struggle of memory against
forgetting.
Czech Writer Mi/an Kundera
The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.
LP Hartely, The Outsiders
Yes, I can forgive and forget. But I need to know who I am forgiving and what I
am forgiving him for.
Witness appearing before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
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11ntroduction
The transition from authoritarian to democratic governance occurred in eleven
Latin American countries between 1979 and 1993. In each case, former
authoritarian regimes committed gross and systematic human rights violations,
resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths throughout the region. The
violations were not the unfortunate or random acts of individual state employees
acting beyond their authority. Rather, they formed one part of a conscious and
systematic policy that used violence to achieve the objectives of the respective
regimes. Once perceived as a threat to the state, opposition political leaders,
social activists and entire sectors of the population were kiled, intimidated or
otherwise removed from the political scene.
The scaleand brutality of the violence made resolving the states' legacy of
human rights violations one of the central issue during transition. Groups in
national society and the international community refused to simply bury the past
and get on with the future, confronting new governments with a series of
dilemmas. How should the persons responsible for committing past violations be
punished? How do societies either reconstruct or create for the first time the
institutions needed to protect and promote human rights? How is it possible to
reconcile opposing groups in society after an extended period of conflict, building
a common culture of tolerance and respect for democratic process? In this
broa der context, the issue of human rights became a point of entry for addressing
larger questions of governance, relations between the state and cIvil society and
"the ethical values that (society) needs to make its future livable" (O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986: 30).
Finding a resolution to the states' legacy of human rights violations was
not simply a matter of launching criminal investigations or implementing the
appropriate institutional and social reforms. In most countries, former
authoritarian actors played a decisive role in shaping the kind of political system
that emerged during transition. They retained power during and after the process,
placing significant political and institutional constraints on new governments and
reform-minded actors in civil society. In particular, authoritarian actors sought a
guarantee that the persons responsible for human rights violations committed
while they were in power would not face criminal sanctions. The constraints were
reinforced by the threat of a renewed intervention in politics if the transition
process undermined the interests of authoritarian actors to an unacceptable
degree.
Truth Commissions have been used in seven Latin American countries to
strike a compromise between these two conflicting demands: the demand of "no
prosecution" made by still-powerful authoritarian actors and those coming from
national society and the international community to investigate past human rights
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iolations and punish the persons responsible.1 Reflecting the dynamics of power
in transition, Truth Commissions are not judicial bodies. Their investigations,
therefore, are not a formal legal accounting of the past, achieved through the due
process of law, that results in criminal sanctions where guilt is established.
Rather, the definition of a Truth Commission includes four primary
elements.2 First, Truth Commissions are temporary bodies established to
investigate gross and systematic human rights violations committed during a
defined period of time in the past. These can include violations committed by
both agents of the state and armed opposition groups. Second, while investigating
individual cases or specific events, a Truth Commission is concerned with
establishing a picture of the systematic pattern of violations used to intimidate
certain sectors of the population. Third, Truth Commissions receive their
mandate from an authoritative body, usually the executive and/or the legislative
branch of government. In the recent cases of El Salvador and Guatemala,
Commissions were established as one part of a larger peace process brokered and
verified by the United Nations.3 Fourth, Truth Commissions are autonomous
bodies set apart from the existing institutions of state and the major parties to
past conflicts. They derive their legitimacy from that differentiation and make a
positive contribution to the transition process only to the extent that
independence is perceived to exist. Taken as a whole, these elements distinguish a
Truth Commission from other investigation processes such as those conducted by
non-governmentalorganizations.
The purpose of a Truth Commission is to support the transition from an
authoritarian to a democratic political system by bringing some form of
resolution to a country's legacy of human rights violations. Towards this end,
Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza write that Truth Commissions have
had four "overlapping goals: creating an authoritative record of what happened;
providing a platform for the victims to tell their stories and obtain some form of
redress; recommending legislative, structural or other changes to avoid a
repetition of past abuses; and establishing who was responsible and providing a
measure of accountability for the perpetrators (of pa st human rights violations)"
(1995: 80). To these Priscilla Hayner adds that a "truth commission can also be
used by the new politicalleaders to demonstrate or underscore a break with the
Truth CommissIons in the Americas include Argentina (1984), Bolivia (1984, the Commission
did not produce a report), Uruguay (1985), Chile (1991), Honduras (1993), El Salvador
(1993), Haiti (1995, the Commission's report has not been made public) and Guatemala
(1997, the Commission presente d its report on 25 February 1999. These are among the
nineteen Truth Commissions have been convened world-wide between 1974 and 1998.
These four elements are taken from a review of the mandates of the Truth Commissions for
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa. The latter Commission was
established in 1996 and is scheduled to present its report to the President of South Africa on
31 luly 1998. Some of these elements are also included in the definition of a Truth
Commission used by Hayner (1994: 604) and Popkin and Roht-Arriaza (1995: 79-83).
Hayner writes that the sanction of an official body vests a Commission "with some sort of
authorIty, by way of its sponsor, that allows it greater access to information, greater security
or protection to dig in to sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its report (than
investigations conducted by non-governmental organisations)" (Hayner, 1994: 604).
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pa st record of human rights abuses (and) as a means to obtain or sustain political
legitimacy" (Hayner, 1994: 604).
Questions remain about how achieving the four goals identified by Popkin
and Roht-Arriaza supports the transition to a democratic polity. Only limited
answers are found in the body of literature on Truth Commissions. While
detailing the accomplishments and short-comings of Commissions in relation to
their mandates, the literature offers little precision on the implications that these
actions have for the overall transition process. In particular, it large ly overlooks
the interaction between Truth Commissions and the other forces in society that
shape the emerging polity. Hayner acknowledges this problem, stating that "it is
clear that truth commissions are not enough to move a country out of its past and
towards a more secure future. We should take a close look at the interplay
between a truth commission and other transitional initiatives, and how a truth
commission might contribute to needed reforms" (1996: 28).
Using the case studies of Chile and El Salvador, this paper presents a
framework for assessing the role of Truth Commissions in political transition.
The central argument is that Commissions have the potential to support the
transition from authoritarian to democratic governance where they contribute to
two essential tasks facing society. First, Commissions must act to dismantle
enclaves of authoritarian power in the transitional polity. These enclaves include
a country's legacy of human rights violations and anti-democratic procedures,
institutions, values and attitudes that are transplanted from the past. Second,
Truth Commissions must simultaneously contribute to the creation of alternatives
to authoritarian governance on which a democratic polit Y can be built and
reproduced over time.
Identifying these two essential tasks allows for Truth Commissions to be
situated within the overall transition process. The framework for assessing their
role begins with the understanding that transition is a multi-dimensional process.
Dynamic change occurs in both the formal political system as well as in the
substantive dimensions of the economic, cultural and social foundations on
which that system is built. In turn, the characteristics of the polit Y that emerges
during transition are shaped by a complex dialectic of interaction between actors
in society seeking to influence the outcome of the process. Truth Commissions
enter into the dialectic of transition as one social force among many.
Building on this understanding of transition, the framework has three
essential components. First, basic definitions of political transition, democracy,
democratie consolidation and authoritarian enclaves are required. These are
drawn from the large body of literature on political transition written during the
past two decades. The definitions describe the dynamics of power during a period
of transition, the characteristics of authoritarian enclaves and the implications
that the presence of such enclaves has for an emerging polity.
Second, it is necessary to determine whether authoritarian enclaves existed
in the countries that are being considered. The mode of transition, or the
mechanisms and agreements between key political actors used to implement a
transition process, is used as one indicator of their presence. Some scholars argue
that there is a direct relationship between the mode of transition and the ability
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of authoritarian actors to impose enclaves on the emerging political system. This
occurs where such actors are not clearly defeated prior to transition and enter
into the process with enough power to condition the terms under which changes
will occur. The mode of transition, therefore, serves as a vehicle for protecting the
interests of authoritarian actors and projecting their power into the future.
Third, the framework identifies the specific enclaves of authoritarian
power that Truth Commissions are able to take action against. Commissions are
not capable of addressing every aspect of a transition process nor can they solve
all of the dilemmas facing societies undergoing change. Their agency is limited by
the human rights focus of their mandates and by de facto power constraints that
exist in the emerging polity. As such, assessing the role of Truth Commissions
requires an understanding of which aspects of the process they can or can not
influence.
Accordingly, this paper argues that transition occurs in specific sites in a
society. The sites of transition exist in both the formal and substantive
dimensions of the polit Y and are identifiable using John Gerard Ruggie's work on
epochal change (1993). Each site of transition is inhabited by different social
forces and it is precisely within their boundaries that the interaction between
authoritarian enclaves and a Truth Commission potentially occurs. By then
juxtaposing the sites of transition with the goals of a Truth Commission as
described by Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, it is possible to identify which
authoritarian enclaves a Truth Commission is able to take action against.
This paper, therefore, is able to come to a determination on the following
questions: What social, political and economic structures supported the former
regime, at the national and international leveis? Which of these structures
survived and were transplanted into the post-transition polit y? In which sites of
transition is change occurring? Which sites fall within the mandate of Truth
Commissions and are subject to action by them? What possibility exists for Truth
Commissions to dismantle the authoritarian enclaves existing in these sites and
contribute to the creation of new structures on which a democratic polit Y can be
built?
1.1 Two case studies
Empirical information to test the framework for assessing the role of Truth
Commissions in political transition is drawn from two case studies: Chile and El
Salvador. The two Commissions are considered classic examples of Commission
processes for the design of their work. In the former country, the transition to
civilian rule to ok place in 1990. President Patricio Alywin Azocar succeeded
General Augusto Pinochet in elections that ended seventeen years of authoritarian
rule. The Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión
de la Verdad y Reconciliación) was convened by President Aylwin on 25 April
1990.4 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was a strictly national body,
mandated, funded and staffed entirely by Chileans without any direct external
involvement. It was chaired by Chilean jurist Raul Rettig and was composed of
The Commission received its mandate under Supreme Decree No. 355 of 1990.
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eight members, including persons with a history of human rights advocacy as
well as scholars and jurists considered to be dose to the former military
government. A staff of sixty researchers supported the investigation. The
Commission presented its report on 9 February 1991 after nine months of
investigation.
It is more precise to speak of two transitions in El Salvador. The first
transition from military to civilian governance took place in 1984. While the
military abandoned formal control of political office, it retained both de jure and
de facto controlover significant aspects of governance. AIso, large sectors of the
population continued to be exduded from participation in the political system. A
second transition, therefore, was needed to resolve the country;s twelve year old
civil war. This to ok place in 1993 with the signing of the Capultepec Peace
Accords between the government of El Savaldor and the Faribundo Marti
National Liberation Front (Frente Faribundo Marti de Liberación Nactiónal-
FMLN) on 16 January 1992.5
The peace process was brokered by the United Nations and its
implementation was verified by the United Nations Observer Mission in El
Salvador (ONUSAL).6 Commenting on the extent of its role, Stephan Baranyi and
Liisa North observe that "no previous UN peace-keeping operation involved as
high a degree of intrusiveness into what has traditionally been considered the
domestic matters of a sovereign state" (Baranyi and North, 1996: 3).
International intervention was required as there were no institutions or actors in
El Salvador with the capacity and perceived neutrality to mediate the negotiations
and guarantee both the implementation of the peace agreements and the safety of
the demobilized combatants and their supporters.7 In the context of Co Id War
rivalry, international actors also played a role in supporting the two sides to the
conflict. Their pressure and support was essential in moving the Salvadoran
government and the FMLN towards negotiations.
Chapultapec Peace Agreements, U.N. Doc. DPI/1208-92614 (1992) at 45-145
The negotiations were also supported by the "Four friends of the Peace Process": Colombia,
Venezuela, Spain and Mexico. These countries "played a special ro le in assisting with the
negotiations and helping overcome deadlocks" (Buergenthal, 1995: 292).
The dynamics of the conflict and the extreme polarisation of Salvadoran society made
international intervention in the peace negotiations necessary. Barbara Walter writes that
"unlike interstate wars, civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlements. Between 1940 and
1990, 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20
percent of civil wars reached a similar conclusion" . Walter notes that internal wars usually
end in a clear defeat for one side to the conflict. However, if a third party intervenes peace
"negotiations almost always succeed". She continues that "adversaries of ten compromise on
basic issues underlying their conflict and they frequently find mutually acceptable solutions to
their problems. Negotiations fail because ... at a time when no legitimate government and no
legal institutions exist to enforce a contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm and
disengage their military forces and prepare for peace". However, once they demobilize, former
combatants are in a vulnerable position and have no way to defend themselves or enforce the
contract reached in negotiations. Walter argues that in most situations of internal conflict, the
combatants prefer defeat than negotiations under such insecure conditions. "Only when an
outside enforcer steps in to guarantee the term (of a peace agreement) do commitments to
disarm and share political power become believable. Only then does co-operation become
possible" (1997: 335-336).
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The Truth Commission for El Salvador (Comisión de la Verdad para El
Salvador) was mandated under the terms of the Chapultapec Peace Accords. The
Commission's report, From Madness to Hope (De la Locura a la Esperanza), was
officially relea sed by the Secretary General of the United Nations on 1 April 1993
(UN Doc. S7/25500). In contrast to its Chilean counterpart, the Truth
Commission for El Salvador was exclusively an international process. The
Commission was headed by three non-Salvadoran individuals appointed by the
Secretary General of the United Nations after consultation with the two parties.8
It was staffed entirely by non-Salvadorans and largely funded by international
donor nations. Commissioner Thomas Buergenthal notes that "the (Salvadoran)
Truth Commission marks the first time that the parties to an internal armed
conflict ... conferred on an international commission composed of foreign
nationals designated by the United Nations the power to investigate human rights
violations ... and make binding recommendations" (1995: 294).
1.2 Structure and methodology
This paper develops a framework to assess the potential role of Truth
Commissions in supporting the transition from authoritarian to democratic
governance. As such, it does not evaluate the actual effectiveness of the Truth
Commissions for Chile and El Salvador in achieving their stated goals. Rather,
within the framework, information is drawn from these twocase studies to
demonstrate which aspects of a transition process Commissions are able to
address and how they do it.
Chapter One presents a theoretical framework for considering the
dynamic of interaction between the social forces that shape the political system
that emerges during transition. On this basis, the role of Truth Commissions in
transition can be demonstrated. The Chapter draws on the extensive body of
literature written during the past two decades on the themes of "political" and
"democratic" transition.
The prima ry source of empirical information for Chapters Two to Four
are the reports of the Truth Commission for Chile and El Salvador. Supporting
information is also drawn from journal articles and the reports of various human
rights organisations. Chapter Three establishes that human rights violations
committed by former authoritarian regimes in Chile and El Salvador were gross
and systematic; violence was used as a deliberate state policy to achieve the
objectives of the government. The state's responsibility for past violations created
a political and legal imperative for new governments to account for the past and
offer the victims, and society at large, some form of resolution. Truth
Commissions were used as a compromise mechanism to achieve this result. In
turn, national and international human rights law provided a moral and
normative framework for their investigations.
Chapter Four considers the role of Truth Commissions in dismantling
The Secretary General named former Colombian President Belisario Betancur, former
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Reinaido Figuerdo and former member of the Inter-american
Court of Human Rights, Prof. Thomas Buergenthal.
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enclaves of authoritarian power in three sites of transltion: Material
Environments (economic structures), Strategic Behaviour (the institutional matrix
of constraints and opportunities that shape the interaction between social actors)
and Social Epistemes (bodies of knowledge and ways of imagining relations
within a political collective).
7
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2 A theoretical framework for assessing the
role of truth commissions in political
transition
2.1 Definitions
Section 2.1 provides the definitions of political transition, democracy and
democratic consolidation needed to describe the dynamics of power during a
period of political transition. The definitions also outline the fundamental tasks
facing a society moving from authoritarian to democratic governance.
2.1.1 The three phases of a poliical transition
Transition is the process of change from one form of political system or regime to
another. In their early work, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter wrote
that "transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of
dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of
some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule or the
emergence of a revolutionary alternative" (1986: 6). It is important to note that
O'Donnell and Schmitter's definition has three possible outcomes, of which the
creation of a democratic polit Y is only one option. A democratic transition begins
"at the moment that authoritarian rulers announce their intention to extend
significantly the sphere of protected individual and group rights and ends with
the advent of a democratic regime" (ibid: 11).
O'Donnell and Schmitter's early definition clearly delimits the beginning
and end points of a transition process. More current literature distinguishes
between the actual phases that a transition may pass through within these limits.
Writing in 1992, O'Donnell observes that democratisation actually implies two
distinct transitions. "The first is the transition from the previous authoritarian
regime to the installation of a democratic government. The second transition is
from this government to the consolidation of democracy, or in other words, to
the effective functioning of a democratic regime (O'Donnell's emphasis)" (1992:
18). Manuel Antonio Garretón divides a transition process into three distinct
phases. "The first is transition, meaning the initial passage from an authoritarian
or military regime to a basic set of democratic institutions. Transition ends with
the inauguration of the new democratic government. Both transition and
inauguration must be distinguished from (the third phase) of consolidation, the
strengthening of the new regime over a period of time (Garretón's emphasis)"
(1995: 146).9
While O'Donnell is more widely cited, this paper wil use Garretón's
definition as it is more precise. Distinguishing between the different phases, his
9 Also see Garretón, 1994: 222.
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model provides a conceptual framework for studying the interaction between the
forces in society shaping the emerging polit Y at different moments in the process.
It also physically situates Truth Commissions within the transition process,
identifying which phases of transition they are intended to address.
Reflecting the overall dynamics of a political transition, Commissions can
work simultaneously in three distinct time frames. In Chile and El Salvador, they
were created by the inaugural regime at the beginning of the second transitional
phase and mandated to investigate the legacy of human rights violations
committed by the former regime. These are events occurring in the past.
However, their resolution is a pre-condition of consolidating a democratic polit Y
in the future, implying the creation of institutions, procedures and values in
society "that prevent such atrocities from ever happening again" (Zalaquett,
1993: xxiii). In this regard, the central objective of Truth Commissions is to
support efforts towards the third phase of democratic consolidation. (Zalaquett,
1993: xxiii; Alfonsin, 1993: 16; Hayner, 1996: 21; Popkin and Roht-Arriaza,
1995: 79; Pasqualucci, 1994: 231-234). This objective is clearly established in the
mandates of the Chilean and Salvadoran Commissions (Rettig, 1993: 5-9 ;
Salvadoran Commission, 1993: 189-192).
2.1.2 Defining democracy
Within the three possible outcomes of a transltion process identified by
O'Donnell and Schmitter, therefore, the stated purpose of a Truth Commission is
to support the second option of creating a democratic political system.
Considering the role of Commissions in transition, therefore, requires a definition
of what kind of polit Y that they are intended to support.
This paper uses Robert Dahl's definition of polyarchy as a minimalist
definition of democracy (1971: 7). Much of the current literature uses Dahl's
concept of polyarchy as a point of departure, expanding on it to describe in more
specific terms the qualities of a democratic polit Y (Diamond, Linz and Lipset,
1989: xvi-xviii; O'Donnell, 1992: 18; Valenzuela, 1992: 60). Paraphrasing Dahl,
O'Donnell writes that "a polyarchy has seven essential attributes: (1) elected
officiais; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) the right to run for
office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative information; and (7)
associational autonomy" (1996: 35). It is important to note that the seven
attributes of a polyarchy are an indivisible whole and that all citizens must have
the unimpaired opportunity to enjoy the rights and obligations that they confer.
Scott Mainwaring describes the concept of polyarchy as "liberal,
procedural and minimalist" (1992: 297). It is critiqued in the literature for the
characteristics of a democratic polit Y that the concept fails to capture and for the
ability of authoritarian regimes to co-exist with many, but not all, of its
attributes. However, both Mainwaring and O'Donnell maintain that the seven
attributes of a polyarchy "establish a crucial cutoff point" that distinguishes
between a democratic government and both "unabashed authoritarian regimes
(and) countries that hold elections but lack some of the characteristics that jointly
define polyarchy" (O'Donnell, 1996: 36).
9
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O'Donnell further argues that polyarchy's narrow focus on the procedural
dimensions of a political system is necessary for methodological reasons,
including the fact that "the distinction between political democracy on the one
hand and socio-economic and cultural democratisation on the other is precIsely
what allows us to explore the various relationships between the two" (1992:
18).10 On this point, he acknowledges that there is a "complex dialectic" of
interaction between politics and other spheres of economic, socIal and cultural
life that has significant implications for the democratic qualities of the polit Y that
is being consolidated (ibid: 19-20).
Similarly, Carlos Villas writes that "although there is no linear correlation
between the political system and socio-economic structures, the existence of some
kind of congruence between one and the other has been stated since the very
beginning of political science" (1996: 462). Villas argues that political systems
have both formal and substantive dimensions. "The substantive dimension refers
to the links between the political system, the socio-economic structure and
cultural patterns, and expresses itself in the content of the demands that the
political system is expected to process and in the way it processes them ..., the
formal dimension refers to the procedures and institutions framing those
relations, procedures and institutions agreed upon byevery actor" (ibid: 461-
462). The complex dialectic between the formal and substantive dimensions of a
polit y, therefore, has direct implications for the characteristics of the political
system that is being consolidated.
Considering a polit Y in all of its formal and substantive dimensions is a
maximalist approach to the study of democracy. Both Vilas (1996: 464-465) and
Garretón (1994: 232) argue that "social democratisation", or the extension of
democracy to other realms of life, must occur before persons are able to enjoy the
democratic rights that exist within the formal realm of politics. Most
importantly, Vilas maintains that "extreme poverty jeopardises the very concept
of citizenship, in as much as such poverty excludes people from access to services
and basic resources- jobs, health and education- which are considered
preconditions for personal autonomy and meaningful political participation"
(1996: 468). It is not possible, therefore, for persons to enjoy all of the rights and
obligations conferred by a polyarchy in the formal political system without socIal
democratisation in its substantive dimensions.
In the context of this paper, there are several reasons for recognising the
relationship between the formal and substantive dimensions of a politicalsystem.
Under the terms of their mandates Truth Commissions are primarily concerned
with the formal dimensions of a polit Y (1995: 80). However, acknowledging that
there is an interaction between the formal and substantive dimensions of a
political system provides the conceptual framework for considering the possibility
that a Commission's investigation will have implications in the emerging polity's
substantive dimensions. In this regard, Chile and El Salvador are characterised by
extreme social and economic inequalities. The situation is particularly difficult in
io Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset make a similar methodological
argument (1989 xvi).
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the latter country where inequality has historically been the fundamental source
of social conflict..ll There is a direct relationship, therefore, between the work of
Truth Commissions and transitional mechanisms working in the areas of
economic and social reforms.
2.1.3 Consolidating a democratie poliical system after transition
Garretón and Q'Donnell write that the consolidation of a democratic political
system is one possible end point of a transition process. At a minimum,
consolidation implies that all of the seven attributes of a polyarchy are
established in the formal dimensions of the polity. In addition, Juan Linz and
Alfred Stephan argue that consolidation is achieved only when "sufficient
agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected
government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free
and popular vote, when this government has the de facto authority to genera te
new policies and when the executive, legislature and judicial power genera te d by
the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure"
(1996: 3).12
Within this definition, Linz and Stephan ascribe three attributes to a
consolidated democracy. "Behaviourally ... no significant national, social,
economic or political actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve
their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime ... Attitudinally ... when a
strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern ... and when support for
anti-democratic alternatives is quite small ... Constitutionally ... when
government and non-government forces alike become subjected to, and
habituated to the resolution of conflicts within the specific laws, procedures and
institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process" (Linz and Stephan, 1996:
6). "In short" write Linz and Stephan, "with consolidation, democracy becomes
routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional and even psychological
life, as well as in the calculations for achieving success" (ibid: 5).
Linz and Stephan are concerned with the formal dimensions of a political
system. However, there is a recognition in the literature that consolidation also
implies a transformation in a polity's substantive dimensions. Garretón writes
that "in Latin America today, democratisation is related to a new phase of socio-
economic development and modernisation as well as to profound political
change" (1995: 147). Moreover, Garretón 1995: 147), Villas (1996: 464) and
11 The 1997 United Nations Human Development Report gives El Salvador a Human
Development Index ranking of 115 out of a total 174 countries. Nicaragua (HDI 117) and
Haiti (HDI 145) were the only countries in the Western Hemisphere with a lower ranking.
Chile has an HDI ranking of 33, the best in Latin America after Costa Rica.12 O'Donnell argues that democratic and anti-democratic elements can co-exist within Linz and
Stephan's definition (1996: 37-39). Similarly, Garretón writes that that a democracy can
become consolidated "yet remain unable to cope with the problems that it is supposed to
solve" . These reia te to "governance, citizenship and institutional frameworks for resolving
demands and conflicts" (1995: 147).
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Jorge Castañeda (1996: 47-48) maintain that extreme inequalities in a society 
are
destabilising to a democratic system and threaten its viability over the long term.
Castañeda goes so far as to conclude that extreme economic inequalities
and a democratic polit Y can not co-exist. He argues that the model of formal
democracy being consolidated taday in Latin America "is not compatible with
the region's social structures, and particularly with the enormous gaps between
rich and poor, black brown and white, town and country, industrial power
houses and rural backwaters" (1996: 4 7). The arguments of Garretón, Vilas and
Castañeda are substantiated by a considerable body of literature demonstrating
that current economic models used in the three countries tend to increase
inequalities, effectively undermining the transition process and potentially leading
to a new cyele of social conflict.13
2.1.4 Perverse institutions, reserve domains and authoritarian
enclaves
Truth Commissions must work towards establishing the elements of a
consolidated democracy if they are to make a positive contribution to the
transition process. The definition of consolidation used by Linz and Stephan
implies that non-democratic elements of the polit y, in both their formal and
substantive dimensions, must be all but eliminated during the transition process.
Similarly, Chilean Commissioner Jose Zalaquett summarises the challenge
confronting societies in transition as follows: "how can a country overcome a
legacy of dictatorial rule and massive human rights violations if the new
government is subjected to significant institutional and political constraints?"
(1993: xxiii). As with Linz and Stephan's definition of democratic consolidation,
Zalaquett is primarily with the dynamic of interaction between the forces and
actors in society supporting and opposing the creation of a democratic political
system. Within this dynamic, the literature identifies two fundamental tasks faced
by the inaugural regime during the second phase of transition.
First, the inaugural regime must eliminate anti-democratic elements of the
polit y, ineluding "institutions, procedures and expectations that are inconsistent
with the minimal workings of a democratic regime" (Valenzuela, 1992: 70). Here
Q'Donnell writes that the inaugural regime must "neutralise those actors in
society who are unconditionally authoritarian, either by isolating them politically
or by turning them into fragmented sects that can not threaten the survival of the
regime" (1992: 21). Second, the regime must simultaneously replace the anti-
democratic elements of the transitional polit Y with new anes on which a
democratic political system can be constructed (Garretón, 1995: 147; O'Donnell,
1992: 21-22; Valenzuela, 1992: 61-64).14 Valenzuela describes these institutions
as "virtuous" to the extent that "they permit the reproduction of the minimal
procedures of democracy" over time (Valenzuela, 1992: 62).15
13 See de Soto and del Castillo (1994) , Boyce (1996) and Boyce (1995).
14 Valenzuela refers to this process as replaeing perverse institutions (anti-democratic) with
virtuous institutions (democratic) (1992: 62).15 Also see Linz and Stephan (1996: 6-16), Karl and Schmitter (1991: 271), McSherry (1992:
463-465) and Mainwaring (1992: 297).
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The literature broadly defines the success of the inaugural regime in terms
of its ability to complete these two essential tasks (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 55;
O'Donnell, 1992: 21-22; Garretón, 1995: 147). Failure to do so results in what
Garretón defines as an "incomplete democracy, a regime that is basically
democratic but riddled with inherited authoritarian enclaves: nondemocratic
institutions, unresolved human rights problems, and social actors not fully wiling
to play by democratic rules" (1995: 147).16 The literature provides a detailed
description of the characteristics of these anti-democratic elements, referring to
them as "perverse institutions" (Valenzuela, 1992: 61-65) or "reserve domains"
(O'Donnell, 1992 : 20; Linz and Stephan, 1996: 67). This paper uses Garretón's
definition as it refers to both formal and substantive aspects of a polity. The basic
characteristic of an enclave is that it removes substantive areas of government
authority and policy making from the purview of elected officials. The power is
retained by authoritarian actors, who enter the transition process with the
capability to either exercise direct controlover important aspects of governance
or to condition the actions of elected officials. It is expressed through the implicit
or explicit threat of the use of force should the interests and prerogatives of these
actors be threatened.
Garretón finds that post-authoritarian situations generally exhibit three
different types of inherited enclaves. The first of the se is the "institutionallegacy,
that is, the co-existence of democratic norms with constitutional or legislative
elements that limit democraticpractice. The second is the enclave of actors,
consisting of groups, organisations principally in the military or linked to the
military, that are not ... integrated into the democratic game, and who may even
conspire against it. The third one, encountered more commonly in countries that
have no previous experiences of democracy (such as the countries of Central
America) ... is the generalized presence of anti-democratic values, mentalities and
attitudes" (1994: 223).
The existence of authoritarian enclaves prevents the consolidation of a
democratic polit Y as described by Linz and Stephan. Significant actors continue to
pursue their objectives outside of the democratic process. These actors are not
fully subjected to the rule of law or the procedural norms of democratic
institutions. Consequently, the inaugural regime is forced to share aspects of
power with anti-democratic actors and can not be said to have the de facto
authority to fully govern. Under these conditions, even the minimalist definition
of democracy as polyarchy can not exist (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 67; Garretón,
1995: 146-147; Valenzuela, 1992: 62). It is precisely enclaves of authoritarian
power, therefore, that Truth Commissions must act against and attempt to
dismantle.
16 Karl refers to "hybrid regimes" in Central America, noting an "uneven acquisitíon of the
procedural requisites of democracy". Civilian controlover the military has not been
established, important sectors of the population remain politically and economically
disenfranchised despite free and fair elections and "impunity is condemned, yet judiciaries
remain weak, rights are violated and contracts broken" (1995: 80).
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2.2 Typographies of modes of transition in Chile and EI
Salvador
Having identified the role of authoritarian enclaves in preventing democratic
consolidation, it is necessary to now determine whether such enclaves existed in
the two polities that are being studied. Two broad themes emerge in the
literature. First, there is a direct relationship between the past and the present.
Linz and Stephan write that "the characteristics of the previous non-democratic
regime have profound implications for the transition paths available and the
tasks faced (by inaugural regimes) as they begin their struggles to develop
consolidated democracies" (1996: 55).17 Second, the mode of transition "to a
significant extent, determines which 'types of democracy' will emerge ... and
whether or not they wil be consolidated" (Karl and Schmitter, 1991: 270). These
two arguments substantiate Garretón's description of authoritarian enclaves as a
problem "inherited" from the former regime (1994: 222-223).
Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter write that "transitions are
produced by actors who chose strategies that lead to change from one regime to
another". They continue that "polities undergoing regime change from autocracy
do so by a variety of means ... these can be specified and clustered into a limited
number of modes of transition" (1991: 269). Modes of transition are defined as
the political mechanisms and agreements used to facilitate a regime change. Once
again, the authors cited are concerned with the dynamic of interaction between
forces in society supporting and opposing the creation of a democratic polity. In
particular, the mode used reflects the power capabilities of the outgoing regime to
negotiate critical features of the transition process, including its ability to impose
authoritarian enclaves on the inaugural regime.
Accordingly, this paper uses the mode of transition employed to effect
change in Chile and El Salvador as one indicator to determine whether enclaves
of authoritarian power existed in their respective polities during transition. The
literature offers various typographies to explain specific transitional situations
and the modes associated with them. While a full review is beyond the scope of
this paper, three such mo dels can be drawn on to describe the process in Chile
and the first transition in El Salvador (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 55- 74;
O'Donnell, 1992: 24- 27; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Valenzuela, 1992: 58- 81;
Mainwaring, 1992: 322). The second transition in El Salvador does not fit easily
into existing models. This is large ly due to the unique circumstances found in
negotiating a political settlement to an extended period of civil war. A fourth
mode of transition is proposed, therefore, drawing on Ricardo Córdova Macías'
concept of a "political regime transition" (1996: 26-28) and the work Karl
(1995: 75-76).
17 Also see Valenzuela, 1992: 73-74.
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2.2.1 Made ane; defeat
The defeat mode of transition was not used in either Chile or El Salvador.
However, it is worth considering to illustrate precisely what did not happen.
Under this typography, the former regime is either defeated in an external war or
collapses as the result of a combination of factors such as failed economic
policies, conflict inside the regime and the agency of an effective opposition. The
defeat mode has led to "transitions in which the former authoritarian rulers were
unable to control the agenda of the issues to be negotiated with the opposition
and the results thereof" (O'Donnell, 1992: 25). Authoritarian actors, therefore,
are left with a limited ability to protect their interests through shaping either the
transition process or the polices of the inaugural regime. O'Donnell argues that
transition by regime collapse offers the best possibility for democratic
consolidation (1992: 24). Opposition actors, including democrats, have the
possibility to be dominant and determine the characteristics of the post-transition
polit Y through their agency.
The defeat typography is of ten used to describe Germany and Japan after
World War Two. Argentina (1983) is cited as the closest example of a Latin
American defeat transition, the consequence of the military regime's failed
economic policies and the humiliating loss of an external war with Great Britain
over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. However, Mainwaring notes that "in no
recent transitions has an authoritarian government been so defeated that it was
incapable of asserting influence over the transition" (1992: 301). Even in the case
of Argentina, the military was able to protect some of its prerogatives and
recovered aspects of its strength by the late-1980s (ibid: 301).
2.2.2 Made twa; pacted transitians
Pacted transitions occur "when elites agree upon a multilateral compromise
between themselves" (Karl and Schmitter, 1991: 275). A series of pacts or
accords are used to protect the interests of the major actors by establishing the
policy orientation of the inaugural regime and delimiting the division of powers
between those actors. Consequently, the pacts determine substantive aspects of
the polit Y inherited by the inaugural regime, particularly regarding the dynamics
of civil-military relations (Karl and Schmitter, 1991; O'Donnell, 1992: 26).
The basic distinguishing feature of a pacted transition is the existence of
authoritarian enclaves in the post-transition polity. While the outgoing regime is
weakened by the events leading to transition, it retains a high degree of power
relative to democratic actors. The regime, therefore, is strong enough to dictate
the terms under which it will relinquish power and exerts a high degree of control
over the rhythm of transition and the issues to be negotiated. Consequently, it is
able to impose enclaves on the inaugural regime with the objective of protecting
the interests, prerogatives and power capabilities of anti-democratic actors into
the future (O'Donnell, 1992: 26; Valenzuela, 1992: 74).
A pacted transition, therefore, does not represent a rupture with the past
(Mainwaring, 1992: 322; Karl and Schmitter, 1991: 273). While temporary in
nature, Karl and Schmitter argue that the pacts have the potential to become a
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permanent part of the polity. "Informal accords between political parties and the
armed forces can establish the initial parameters of civilian and military spheres
in ways that deviate from formal constitutional norms. Thus, what at the time
may appear to be temporary alliances during the uncertain transition may
become persistent barriers to change" (1991: 273).
The pacted typography is of ten used to describe the situation in Chile. The
outgoing regime of General Pinochet imposed three basic demands on the
inaugural regime as a condition of permitting the transition to occur, all of which
placed limitations on the sovereign authority of the civilian government. First was
a pact of institutional continuity that allowed the military to retain significant
autonomy from civilian oversight. Many of the prerogatives enjoyed by the
military during the years of dictatorship were entrenched in the 1980 constitution
and the institutional and procedural structure of the new polity. Pinochet also
secured the continuity of the military leadership, allowing him to remain as chief
of the Armed Forces until 1998 (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 206-209; Loveman,
1994: 121; Americas Watch, 1994; Valenzuela, 1993; 63-64; Zalaquett, 1993:
') 18XXVi.
Second was a pact of impunity for past human rights violations. The
Pinochet regime demanded a guarantee that members of the military would not
be prosecuted for human rights violations committed between 1973 and 1978.
That guarantee was institutionalised in the Amnesty Law of 1978, astatute that
was upheld by the Chilean Supreme Court in 1990 and 1993 (Loveman, 1994:
118; Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 1995: 110; Zalaquett, 1993: XXVi).19
Third was a pact of economic continuity. In reference to Chile, Casteñada
notes that "the only way for nascent democratic regimes to last was if they
gU3ranteed the economic and social polices that have been carried out by the
dicta torshi ps tha t had preceded them" (1996: 44). The return to democra tic
governance in Chile, therefore, was conditional on continuing the free market
economic policies implemented by thePinochet government. The presence of
these three pacts resulted in a transfer that allowed the institution of the military
and its civilian allies to retain significant power into the second phase of
transition.
18 Pinochet was scheduled to step down as head of the Armed Forces in March, 1998, moving to
a position in the Sena te. However, a group of Senators is trying to prevent Pinochet from
assuming his new position, charging that it would be a "dishonor to the democratic
institutions (PinochetJ once betrayed". As aresult, Pinochet has stated that he will not ste p
down from his position with the military, setting the stage for a confrontation with the
government (Haldelman, 1998).19 Legislative Decree 2191 of April 1978 grants amnesty for agents of the state from September
1973 to April 1978. This covers the period of martial law imposed after the coup when most
human rights violations occurred. Shortly before the transition, General Pinochet told
reporters that "the day they touch any of my men will be the end of the state of law".
Pinochet sa id that the military "would not accept" the prosecution of its members (Boston
Globe article as quoted by Huntington, 1995: 71).
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2.2.3 Made three; extrication from rule by the hierarchical military
A variation of the pacted transition model is extrication from rule by the
hierarchical military (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 59; 66-68).20 Linz and Stephan
observe that the military is a "permanent part of the state apparatus, with
enduring interests and permanent functions that transcend the interests of the
government of the day" (ibid: 67). When the military holds formal political
power, the actions of the "militaryas government" may threaten those interests.
In this context, the "militaryas an institution" plays a role in pressuring the
"militaryas a government" to withdraw from direct rule by holding "extrication
elections" (ibid: 59).
Of all the possible modes of transition, Linz and Stephan argue that
extrication offers the outgoing regime the greatest ability to impose authoritarian
enclaves on the inaugural government. The regime is not defeated and may not
even be significantly weakened by the events leading to transition. Rather, the
transition to civilian governance is part of a strategy to protect the long-term
interests, prerogatives and institutional integrity of the mi lita ry . It chooses to
formally lea ve office byentering into a power sharing agreement with a limited
number of civilians who are either allies or share common interests. Under this
scenario, the political system is not open or competitive and the inaugural
government may have neither de facto nor de jure autonomy (Linz and Stephan,
1996: 67; Mainwaring, 1992: 321-324).
The transition by extrication mode describes the first regime change in El
Salvador (1984). Linz and Stephan note that the ability of the military to impose
enclaves declines with the severity of the crisis leading to extrication. In El
Salvador, that crisis resulted from a \ combination of economic factors,
international pressure, the inability of the military to defeat armed opposition
groups and the erratic behaviour of the "militaryas government" (Linz and
Stephan, 1996: 58). These factors combined to force the military from officially
holding office. However, it retained the power capabilities necessary to impose
significant enclaves on the post-transition polity. According to the report of the
Truth Commission for El Salvador, during this period the military "ended up
totally controlling the civilian authorities, frequently in collusion with some
influential civilians. None of the three branches of the government -judicial,
legislative or executive- was capable of restraining the military's overwhelming
control of society" (1993: 172).
The prerogatives of the military and their civilian allies during the first
transition were protected through the three essential pacts that also facilitated
transition in Chile. Participation in the formal political system was limited to a
few political parties acceptable to the military. Large sectors of the population,
therefore, remained excluded from any meaningful participation. A significant
change in the orientation of economic policy was not part of the transition
agreement with the new civilian authorities and the pact of impunity was
20 Mainwaring (1992:322-323) offers a similar typography, noting that the cost of governing
becomes toa high for the military. However, he argues that the military has limited power
capabilities to shape the post-transitional polity.
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established in the form of an amnesty law. The law was passed by the outgoing
military regime in 1984 to prevent prosecution for violations committed during
their tenure in office (Loveman, 1994: 118).
2.2.4 Made (aur; poliical regime transition
The literature on modes of transition does not describe the second transition in El
Salvador. This is largely due to the unique circumstances that shape a negotiated
solution to an extended period of armed conflict. This paper, therefore, uses
Córdova's concept of a "political regime transition" to describe the process in
that country (1996: 27). Córdova argues that the political regime mode of
transition does not focus on who has power, but rather on "the patterns that
determine the means and channels of access to power, the margins of action of
those already in power and the characteristics of the actors that are admitted to
and excluded from this access to power" (ibid: 27). The objective, therefore, is to
reform the formal political system to allow for the participation of important
actors in society who were formerly excluded from it.
There are two features that distinguish Córdova's political regime
transition from other modes. First, the transition from military to civilian rule
had previously taken place in El Salvador. Although dominated by the military,
the second transition was formally negotiated by an elected civilian government.21
This dynamic created the preconditions for the second characteristic. A political
regime transition does not imply an actual change in government nor is such a
change an item for negotiation as in the case of the pacted or extrication modes
(Córdova, 1996: 27-28). Rather, the regime that initiated the first transitional
phase in El Salvador became the inaugural regime in its second phase. The
transition was solely concerned with expanding the democratic qualities of the
political system to ensure that formerly excluded groups had the possibility of
winning power at some point in the future.
Political regime transition in El Salvador was the result of a political and
military stalemate between the government and armed opposition groups.
Córdova describes this crisis of hegemony "in which the principle actors had veto
power or the means to neutralize the initiatives of the other, but lacked sufficient
power to impose themselves or their programs on the rest of the political actors"
(1996: 47). Similarly, Karl maintains that the stalemate was the result of "the
conditional victory of old and new dominant groups as well as the conditional
defeat of popular organizations" (1995: 76). By these descriptions, opposition
groups had enough power to force the transition and to extract significant
concessions from the government in relation to their ability to participate in the
formal political system. The result was not a change in government, but the
creation of a new space in the formal polit Y where the opposition could contest
elected office.22
21 Buergenthal's account of the Truth Commission proeess in El Salvador indicates that the
military was a significant force shaping the peace negotiations. Without its support, the
process could not have proceeded (1995).22 The most important opposition group was the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN), a coalition of different armed revolutionary movments.
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Without a change in the actual government, former authoritarian actors
retained significant power to impose enclaves on the new political system in El
Salvador. The inaugural regime also assumed the responsibility of accounting for
past human rights violations that occurred while it was in power. On this point,
Buergenthal observes that "it is important to recall that the very governmental
institutions and individuals responsible for many of the most egregious acts of
violence in El Salvador remained in places of power ... the situation would have
been quite different had a transitional government assumed power after the
signing of the peace negotiations or if a change had occurred in the leadership of
the military and security forces as well as in the judiciary" (1995: 301).
Elements of the three essential pacts were also found in the Salvadoran
transition agreements. First, despite political reforms under the peace agreements,
the institutional structure of the pre-transition state remained large ly intact. The
government of El Salvador, therefore, can be said to have negotiated institutional
continuity into the peace process.23 Second, the basic economic policies of the
Salvadoran state were not subject to negotiation during transition. Rather, the
transition process appears to have entrenched those policies with the support of
the international community. On this point, de Soto notes that during the peace
negotiations "there was a second process underway. Sponsored by the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, it called for implementing a
rigorous economic stabilisation and structural adjustment program" (de Soto and
del Castillo, 1994: 70). These reforms supported the economic policies of the
former and at once inaugural government.
Third, the Salvadoran Congress passed an amnesty law presente d by
President Cristiani only four days after the Truth Commission submitted its
report. The law prevents the persons identified by the Commission from being
tried in the Salvadoran court system (Buergenthal, 1995: 319). It also strengthens
two previous amnesty laws that were passed by the government in 1984 and
1992.24 As such, the guarantee of "no prosecution" was also entrenched in the
transitional polit Y .
2.3 John Gerard Ruggie and the Theory of Epochal Change
The modes of transition used in Chile and El Salvador allowed authoritarian
actors to impose significant enclaves on the transitional polities of both countries.
To assess the role of Truth Commissions in carrying out the two fundamental
transitional tasks of dismantling the se enclaves while supporting the creation of
23 This statement is made recognising that the opening of the political system creates the
possibility for significant change in the future. Here Karl argues that "social forces (in El
Salvador) have been profoundly transformed and the objective conditions make compromise
more essential than before". These factors mean that a return to bla tant authoritarian rule
unlikely (1995: 73).24 These laws included the Partial Amnesty of 1987, Legislative Decree 805; the Law on the
General Amnesty for the Consolidation of Peace, Decree No. 486 of 20 March 1992; and the
Law of National Reconciliation, Legislative Decree 147 of 23 January 1997. The latter the
1993 law extinguished civil and criminal resp onsi bil it y related to specific crimes investigated
by the Truth Commission for El Salvador.
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new democratic structures and values, it is necessary to determine which specific
enclaves Commissions are capable of acting against. This is done using John
Gerard Ruggie's work on epochal change (1993: 140-174).
Ruggie asks the question "whether the modern system of states may be
yielding in some instances to post-modern forms of configuring political space"
(1993: 144). In proposing a framework for studying the process of
transformation in modes of human organisation, Ruggie reaches into the past to
explore the origins of modernity. He argues that the state was "socially
constructed" (ibid: 152). It was "invented by early modern Europeans" (ibid:
166), evolving out of the feudal system as the result of "changes in several
domains of socIallife" (ibid: 168).
To identify the forces that shaped epochal change, Ruggie explores "the
raw materials that people used and drew upon in constructing (modernity) " . He
finds that "developments in three dimensions of the European collective
experience were particularly salient, and that these three dimensions are
irreducible to one another: namely material environments, strategic behaviour
and social epistemology (author's emphasis)" (Ruggie,1993: 152). These
dimensions can be understood as sites of transition where dynamic change occurs
in a society. The fact that they are irreducible to each other means that a change
in any one sIte has the potential to provoke changes in the other two sites over
time. Ruggie's concept of epochal change, therefore, is consistent with the notion
of a "complex dialectic" between the formal and substantive dimensions of a
polit Y that was described by O'Donnell and Vilas in Section 2.1.2.
An evolution in the three dimensions of material environments, strategic
behaviour and social epistemology provoked and/or responded to the appearance
of new modes of differentiation in the realm of international relations.
Differentiation refers to the forms of organisation that separate one human
collective from another. Ruggie writes that the mode of differentiation "within
any collectivity ... is nothing less than the central focus of the epochal study of
rule" (1993: 168). He uses the concept to explore the spatial and political
characteristics of the modern state, noting that the state" differentiated its subject
collectivity into territorially defined, fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of
legitimate domain" (ibid: 151). These characteristics determine not only the
state's internal modes of organisation, but also those in the "international
collectivity" of relations between nation states (ibid: 168).
Ruggie's framework for epochal change is relevant to the study of Truth
Commissions in Chile and El Salvador for four distinct reasons. First, his three
sites of transition identify where change may be occurring in those societies.
Second, identifying these sites allows this paper to determine in which aspects of
the transition process a Truth Commission is capable of taking action. This can
be done by juxtaposing the sites of transition with the mandate of a Truth
Commission and their four goals as described by Popkin and Roht-Arriaza in
Chapter One (1995: 80).
Third, sites of transition falling in to the mandate of a Truth Commission
are precisely where that Commission enters the dialectic of transition, interacting
with the other forces that shape the emerging polity. In turn, a Commission itself
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provides a space where interaction may occur, shaping the characteristics of the
transition process according to its objectives and capabilities. By their agency,
therefore, Commissions can become a transitional force in their own right.
Fourth, any change resulting from the interaction between Truth Commissions
and other transitional forces has the potential to reconfigure the modes of
differentiation on which a society is organised. This reconfiguration may include
the emergence of new democratic structures in both the formal and substantive
dimensions of the polity.
2.3.1 Unbundled territories: Human rights and the proeess of
change in International Relations
The "unbundling of territory" is not aspecific site of transition. Rather, it is a
process used by Ruggie to explain changes in the mode of differentiation that
structure the international polity. As it relates to the emergence of international
human rights norms, the unbundling of territory created the conditions for Truth
Commissions to come into being. The process, therefore, must be discussed in
order to understand both the characteristics of Commissions and the form of
action that they can take against enclaves of authoritarian power.
Ruggie writes that "the terra in of unbundled territories ... is the place
wherein the rearticulation of political space would be occurring today" (1993:
171). The defining characteristic of unbundled territories is the "negation" of
sovereign jurisdiction (ibid: 165). Differentiation in modern international
relations is based on the principle of reciprocal sovereignty, the mutual
recognition among states that each will exercise exclusive jurisdiction within its
territorial boundaries (ibid: 162). This state-centric view is best described by
Realist theory, which is "deeply implicated in the project of modernity" (ibid:
146). Ruggie finds evidence of new modes of differentiation in the international
polit Y that result from the emergence of non-state spaces where political,
economic and social activity is occurring.25 Aspects of the sovereign authority are
being relocated to these spaces to be wielded by the international community or
by non-state actors, in turn limiting or reconfiguring the authority remaining
with the state (ibid: 171-174).
Ruggie argues that the evolution of new modes of differentiation is
produced by the appearance of "a new set of spatial, metaphysical and doctrinal
constructs through which the visualisation of the collective existence on the
planet is shaped" (1993: 173). Human rights are one such construct. In their
epistemic dimension, they provide a "unit of discourse" around which
international actors can "cluster" (see Section 2.3.4). Their relevance is not
determined by territoriality. Rather, the concept of rights speaks to fundamental
human values that are commonly held by societies across the boundaries of the
modern state. As a "system of understanding" or "a body of ideas that shapes the
perception of knowledge", they find meaning across physical space and in
25 Ruggie is concerned with the new political configuration of the European Union (ibid: 171)
and the "non-territorial region of the world economy, a decentered yet integrated space-of-
flows ... which exists alongside the space-of-places we call national economies" (ibid: 172).
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dissimilar cultural contexts. As such, Neil Nevitte describes human rights as a
"transnational issue" (1996: 84-86). Kathryn Sikkink also writes that human
rights embody a set of internationally "shared values or principled ideas- ideas
about what is right and wrong" (1993: 412).
Accordingly, Stephen Marks (1993), Jack Donnelly (1993; 1994), Jim
George (1993), Sikkink (1993) and Nevitte (1996) all argue that human rights
have "for the first time ... become a dimension of international affairs" (Marks,
1993: 295). The "formal evidence" that states accept the rules of human rights is
their ratification of international treaties and conventions (ibid: 28). These
instruments shape the limits of what national governments can openly do and
establish minimum standards for compliance with the norms that they embody.
Once states become signatories to a human rights instrument, they assume "an
obligation to comply in good faith with the ... obligations which they have
undertaken" (Pasqualucci, 1994: 329). Compliance implies full implementation
of the terms of the instrument, including harmonising national law to make it
consistent with international standards.
States also accept that they are accountable before the international
community for their performance in meeting these obligations. The state,
therefore, is no longer the sole guarantor of human rights within its territorial
jurisdiction.26 Accordingly, the understandings of sovereignty itself being
modified "in relation to specific issues that are deemed of suffcient importance to
the international community to limit the scope of sovereign authority" (Sikkink,
1993: 415).
Nevitte (1996), Sikkink (1993) and Laura MacDonald (1994) als o note
the appearance of "issue driven political formations pushing a variety of new
causes into their respective national political agendas" (Nevitte, 1996: 85). These
include non-governmental organisations that advocate for (is "for" needed?) the
protection and promotion of human rights. Sikkink refers to these organisations
as forming "principled issue networks" linked internationally through
decentralised networks that are "bound together by shared values and by dense
exchanges of information and services ... " (1993: 415). While the nation state is
traditionally understood as the unitary actor in international relations, non-
governmental organisations are emerging as legitimate actors in their own right,
with the power to influence national political agendas (Nevitte, 1996: 84-85).
Non-state actors work nationally and internationally to place human rights at the
centre of the political agenda both before and during transition, particularly in
disseminating information and advocating for state accountability. They were a
central force in Chile and El Salvador creating political pressure that lead to the
formation of Truth Commissions.
As noted, changing modes of differentiation in international relations
created the basic conditions for Truth Commissions to come into being. First, the
concept of human rights came to symbolise larger issues of governance in many
26 The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, describes this process by writing
that "when State protection (becomes) State abuse, the international community, through the
mechanisms of guarantee that it has in place, becomes the only recourse for the universal
rights of the individual failed and abandoned by the State" (1997: 3).
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Latin American countries before and during transition. Garretón writes that
"what happened is that the systematic repression under these (past authoritarian
regimes) implied aregression that at the center of society the problem of life in its
elemental, almost biological dimensions of survival or physical integrity. This
regression was challenged in the name of human rights" (1994: 222). The
concept of rights, therefore, served as a conceptual framework for challenging
authoritarian regimes and proposing new models of governance.
Second, international instruments provide the legal basis that compels
inauguralregimes to investigate the human rights record of their authoritarian
predecessors. The instruments also provide a conceptual and normative frame-
work for convening a Commission, including shaping their mandates and
methodology. Third, Truth Commissions constitute aspace for non-govern-
mental and international actors to enter the dialectic of transition occurring
among national forces. The presence of these actorshas the potential to alter the
national balance of power, potentially enhancing the capabilities democratic
actors while simultaneously placing limits on authoritarian actors. Here Ruggie's
definition of an unbundled territory best describes the situation in El Salvador
where the international community has played a central role in negotiating,
verifying and financially supporting the transition process.
2.3.2 Site ane: Material enviranments
From considering changes in the realm of international relations that allowed
Truth Commissions to come into being, it isnow possible to consider the specific
sites in national society where transition may be occurring. The first site
identified by Ruggie is material environments. Ruggie's definition of material
environments includes the evolution of new economic structures and technology,
climate change and human demographics. These relate to "human ecology,
relations of production and relations of force (1993: 152). This paper narrows
Ruggie's definition to focus on changes that specifically occur in the economy of
a country.
Ruggie argues that "changes in the material world (at the end of the
fourteenth century) were so profound that existing social arrangements were
strained to the point of collapse" (ibid: 154).27 Similarly, an evolution in the site
of material environments was a central factor shaping political transition
throughout Latin America. Economic inequalities and the concentration of power
in the hands of a small elite were among the most significant historical causes of
social conflict in the region. Changes in the international economy during the
1980s and 1990s further pressed the need for the creation of new political and
economic models.
Enclaves of authoritarian power may exist in site of material environments
where a pact of economic continuity was imposed by the former regime and its
allies (see Section 2.2). However, Truth Commissions generally focus on issues
27 Material factors provoking the transition to modernity include emerging economic structures,
technology, climate change and human demographics. These reia te to "human ecology,
relations of production and relations of force (Ruggie, 1993: 152).
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related to the protection and promotion of human rights. In particular, the
mandates of the Commissions for Chile and El Salvador include no mention of
economic issues. Therefore, while a Truth Commission may indirectly open
political space for democratic decision making on economic policy, issues falling
with the realm of material environments must be dealt with using other
initiatives.
2.3.3 Site two: Strategic behaviour
Ruggie's definition of strategic behaviour includes the totality of the political,
legal and economic structures that emerged in the midd le ages to regulate human
activity and establish territorially fixed units of exclusive political control. He
describes these structures as "the matrix of constraints and opportunities within
which social actors interact" (1993: 168). This paper narrows Ruggie's definition
to focus on changes in the formal political system, particularly as these relate to
the protection and promotion of human rights.
Truth Commissions have the potential to alter the matrix of constrâints
and opportunities in the transitional polit Y through their third goal of
"recommend(ing) legislative, structural or other changes to avoid a repetition of
past abuses" (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 1995: 80). This is particularly the case
where the recommendations are binding on the inaugural regime or the parties to
a peace agreement.28 However, even when a Commission's recommendations are
not binding, they can still "provide a pressure point around which civilian society
and the international community can lobby for change in the future" (Hayner,
1994: 609). The fourth goal of "establishing who was responsible and providing
a measure of accountability" is also relevant as it speaks to the effective
functioning of state judicial and law enforcement institutions (Popkin and Roht-
Arriaza, 1995: 80).
Most of the fifteen Truth Commissions studie d by Hayner (1995: 609)
and all four of the Commissions reviewed by Popkin and Roht-Arriaza (1995:
101-104)- Chile, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala- made recommendations
to prevent a repetition of the human rights violations that they encountered.
While differing in their emphasis, they included measures to strengthen
democratic institutions, ensure adherence to international human rights treaties,
reforms to the judicial and law enforcement institutions, measures to
professionalise the military and subordinate it to cIvilian control and
compensation to the victims and their families.
In fulfilling their third goal, Truth Commission interact with the
authoritarian enclaves that may have been imposed on the transitional polit Y
through the pact of institutional continuity. These include anti-democratic
institutions, constitutional elements and procedures that were identified by
Garretón in Section 2.2 (1994: 223). It is important to note that Truth
Commissions are not implementing bodies. As such, they do not have the power
to reform the institutions of state on their own accord. This is the responsibility
28 Hayner notes that in most ca ses, the recommendations of Truth Commissions have not been
binding on the government or the parties to a peace agreement (1994: 609).
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of the inaugural regime, it successors and national political institutions. However,
one measure of the success of a Truth Commission over the long term is the
degree to which its recommendations are accepted and implemented.
2.3.4 Site three: Social epistemes
Epistemes are defined by the Oxford Dictionary as "systems of understanding" or
"a body of ideas that shapes the perception of knowledge at a particular period".
Ruggie refers to these in their collectivity as social epistemes, the basis on which
societies imagine themselves, create symbols and identities "and conceive of
appropriate orders of rule and exchange" (1993: 157). He writes that the decline
of the medieval system of rule and the evolution of modernity "resulted in part
from a transformation in socIal epistemology ... the mental equipment that
people drew upon in imagining and symbolising forms of political community
underwent fundamental change" (ibid: 157). Ruggie concludes that "material
changes may have awakened both a need and a desire for this broad
transformation in the prevailing social epistemes, which produced fundamentally
new spatial forms (of human organisation)" (ibid: 160).
Benedict Anderson uses a similar concept to explain modern nationalism.
Anderson defines the nation state as an "imagined political community" bound
together by the ability of citizens to imagine their relationships with other citizens
and with the nation. He writes that the "members of the smallest nation wil
never know most of their fellow cItizens ... yet in their mind each lives in the
image of their community". These communities "are to be distinguished ... by the
st yle in which they are imagined". Anderson, therefore, also defines the modern
state as an "invented" construct. The process of imagining relationships forms
the basis of identity on which modes of political organisation are constructed
(1991: 6).
Truth Commissions have the potential to support transition where they
create new "bodies of knowledge" and ways of "imagining" socIal relations. This
implies reconstructing the systems of values, symbols and identity that shape the
interaction between cIvil society and the state and at the more personal level
between individual members of society. Where this occurs, a Commission can act
to dismantle the "culture of fear" that serves as the epistemic foundation of the
former authoritarian regime (Corradi, 1992: 3). According to Corradi, Latin
American dictatorships were "institutionalized systems that deliberately produced
and spread fear" (ibid: 23). Fear resulted from the combined effect of the regime's
rep res sive polices, the absence of institutional protection and efforts to impose
authoritarian social, political and economic models. The Doctrine of National
Security provided the ideology, symbols and other epistemic constructions that
authoritarian regimes used to maintain their power and rationalise their actions
(see Chapter 3).
The socIal groups in power feared that they might lose their privilege,
sensing that their victory was temporary and that "the tables might someday be
turne d on them and the losers will take their revenge" (Garretón, 1992: 14).
Dissenting groups in society feared the overwhelming power of the state. Their
fear was reinforced by a feeling of vulnerability and weakness anda "sense of
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having lost the opportunity for personal or collective realization. It combines fear
of terror or repression with that of the future ... a situation that wil be fraught
with unknown dangers" (Garretón, 1992: 14). These fears feed on each other to
the point where they become a "permanent and muffed undertone of public life"
(Corradi., 1992: 4). The legacy of fear in the transitional polit Y "wil affect not
only the behaviour of individuals in their private lives but also their way of
adapting to society, their confidence in others and in institutions, and their
acceptance or rejection of politics" (ibid: 22-23).
There are two fundamental ways that a Truth Commission can act in the
site of social epistemes. First, Commissions constitute an authoritative body that
acts to reinforce and legitimise the values of basic human rights in governance,
public discourse and "imagination" . This constructs a basis on which new forms
of social relations and alternatives to authoritarian rule can be imagined. Second,
through their first goal, Commissions "create an authoritative account of the
past" (Popkin and Roht- Arriaza, 1995: 79). Hayner argues that this record
constitutes an "acknowledged truth" that is officially sanctioned by an
authoritative body and becomes part of the collective memory of society (1994:
607). The recovery of the "truth" changes public discourse by clarifying a
contested history and recognising acts of violence that are of ten denied by the
outgoing regime. The second goal of "providing a platform for the victims to tell
their stories" supports the process of creating an authoritative account by both
providing information and legitimising the stories of the victims.
Table 1: Sites of transition and the interaction between Truth Commissions and
authoritarian enclaves
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3 Responding to a legacy of gross and
systematic human rights violations
Chapter Three reviews the essential attributes of the Truth Commissions for
Chile and El Salvador. These attributes are considered in light of the four
objectives of a Commission as defined by Popkin and Roht-Arriaza: creating an
authoritative record of what happened; providing a platform for the victims to
tell their story and obtain some form of redress; recommending legislative,
structural, or other changes to avoid a repetition of past abuses; and establishing
who was responsible and providing a measure of accountability for the
perpetrators (1995: 79). The Chapter argues that the respective inaugural regimes
were compelled to create Truth Commissions as a result of the political and legal
imperatives arising from their responsibility for past gross and systematic human
rights violations. In turn, the characteristics of the two Commissions were shaped
by these imperatives.
3.1 General characteristics of the Truth Commissions for
Chile and EI Salvador
The Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation and the Truth
Commission for El Salvador were investigatory bodies established by the
respective inaugural regimes during the second phase of transition. The
Commissions were mandated to investigate past violations of national and
international human rights law that occurred within a fixed historical period29
and to produce a report of their findings. These included violations committed by
both agents of the state and armed opposition groups.30 The two Commissions
were temporary bodies with no permanent or enduring functions31 and were
dissolved after the presentation of their reports32.
29 The Chilean Commission was mandated to investigate events occurring between September
11, 1973 and March 11, 1990. This period of time begins with the coup that brought the
Pinochet regime to power and ends with the transition to a civilian government. The
Salvadoran Commission investigated acts committed between the escalation of the civil
conflict in 1980 and the signing of the peace accords in 1991.30 The Truth Commission for El Salvador noted that international law usually only applies to
governments. However, the Commission determined that both sides in an armed conflict are
bound by international humanitarian law. Also, as the FMLN assumed governmental powers
in the territory that it controlled, it toa "can be required to observe certain human rights
obligations that are binding on states under international law. This would make them
responsible for breaches of those obligations" (1993: 20). Similarly, the Chilean Commission
was mandated to con sider violations committed by armed opposition groups and "private
citizens for political purposes" (Rettig, 1993: 6).31 Chilean Commission was given a maximum of twelve months to complete its work while the
Salvadoran Commission was to submit a report after only six months of investigation. It
subsequently took eight months to complete its work.32 Article 4d of the Chilean Commission's mandate specifies that "with the submission of its
report the Commission wil conclude its work and wil be automatically dissolved" . Article 13
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Popkin and Roht Arriaza note that opting for an ad hoc investigatory
body resolved a number of practical problems by providing the governments of
Chile and El Salvador with a "shortcut to some of the difficulties inherent in
using normal investigatory channeis" (1995: 82). Reforming or creating a
judiciary capable of undertaking an independent inquiry into the politically
charged issue of human rights was a long term process unable to respond to the
immediate demands of transition. AIso, "the sheer magnitude of past violations, a
dearth of evidence concerning the crimes that occurred years earlier, and the
unwillingness of witness to testify in unreliable courts further complicated the
task" (ibid: 82). Hayner ad ds that a criminal process usually focuses on the facts
as they exist in a single case, making the court system unable to deal with broader
issues related to politically motivated violence that affects society at large (1996:
22). These practical difficulties contributed to the decision of inaugural regimes in
Chile and El Salvador to use a Truth Commission over other methods of
in vestiga tion.
3.1.1 Creating an authoritative account of the past
To achieve their objective of investigating past violations and producing an
authoritative historical account of what happened, the Truth Commissions for
Chile and El Salvador were mandated as follows:
Table2: Creating an authoritative record of past violations
Both Commissions placed an emphasis on creating a picture of the overall pattern
of past human rights violations and the motivations of the persons and
institutions that committed them. However, differences in the scale, patterns and
dynamics of violence produced two distinct investigating methodologies. The
Chilean Commission was instructed to "draw up as complete a picture as
possible" through resolving each individual complaint ofa serious violation that
resulted in the death or disappearance of the victim (Rettig: 1993: 5). Its mandate
specified that the Commission was to "restore the dignity of the victims in the
public mind, allow their relatives and mourners to honor them fittingly, and in
of the Salvadoran Commission's mandate states that "once the report has been handed over,
the Commission's mandate shall be consider terminated and the Commission shall be
dissol ved" .
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some measure make it possible to make amen ds for the damage done" (ibid: 5).
By using information from individual cases, the Commission demonstrated how
each act of violence formed part of a conscIous and deliberate policy to eliminate
opponents of the Pinochet regime.
The Truth Commission for El Salvador interpreted its mandate as
instructing the Commission to investigate "systematic patterns of violence used to
intimidate certain sectors of society" (1993: 10). The larger scale of the violence
and the constraints placed on the Commission by its mandate made investigating
each individual case of a human rights violation impossible.J3 Instead, the
Commissioners chose thirty-three well known cases that ilustrated the general
patterns and characteristics of past human rights violations. Most of the cases
involved multiple violations occurring as the result of a single action, such as the
massacre of peasants at El Mozote.34 Other cases, such as the assassination of
Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero (1980) and six Jesuit priests (1989) received
international attention and came to symbolise the brutality of the conflict
The ability of the Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador to create
an authoritative record reste d on several factors. First, both Commissions were
officially sanctioned by an authoritative body. The former received its mandate
from the Executive Branch of governmenes while the Salvadoran Commission
was the product of a negotiated agreement between the government and the
FMLN.36 As noted in Chapter ane, the Salvadoran Commission conducted its
investigation under the authority and supervision of the United Nations and
submitted its report simultaneously to the Secretary General of the UN, the
Salvadoran government and the FMLN.
Second, while receiving an official sanction, the Commissions were at the
same time differentiated from the institutions of state and actors central to the
past conflict. Society in Chile and El Salvador was extremely polarised after
extended periods of violent civil conflict. There was a fundamental absence of
trust between the main actors in those conflicts and, more generally, between civil
society and the state. Transition, therefore, required the creation of a new space
for ad dressing human rights issues that was set apart from the existing
institutions.
This independence was established by appointing credible figures to
conduct the investigation. The Chilean Commission was made up of eight
"respected individuals" taken from across the political sphere, including a former
member of Pinochets cabinet, who did not have military or security
33 Buergenthal notes that the Commission was restrained from conducting further investigations
by its short six mo nth mandate, the lack of financial resources and the desire of both parties to
conclude the investigation quickly (1995: 296).
34 Members of the Salvadoran military killed 500 unarmed civilians in the village of El Mozote
on 10 December 1981. The Commission's investigation determined that "most of the victims
were minors" (1993: 117).35 Supreme Decree No.355, April 25, 1990, issued jointly by the Executive Branch, the Ministry
of Justice and the Under-Secretary of the Interior and signed by President Patricio Aylwin
Azocar and the two respective Ministers.
36 El Salvador Peace Agreement signed at Chapultepec, Mexico, on 16 January 1992 between the
Government of El Salvador and the leadership of the FMLN.
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responsibilities, and human rights activistS. Reflecting the role of the United
Nations, the moral authority and independence of the Salvadoran Commission
was enhanced by appointing three international figures as Commissioners and
prohibiting the use of Central Americans on the Commission's staff. Salvadoran
nationals did not participate as the government and the FMLN could not come to
an agreement "on any gro up of Salvadorans they would trust to discharge (the
Commission's) responsibilities. A formula calling for a panel of distinguished
foreigners ... proved less objectionable and was eventually accepted by the
Parties" (Buergenthal, 1995: 296).
Third, an official state sanction also responds to the practical
considerations of conducting a human rights investigation. The endorsement of
an authoritative body enhanced the Commission's legal and political power,
access to information, state protection to undertake their investigations and
increased the likelihood that its conclusions and recommendations would be
given serious consideration (Hayner: 1996: 21). These forms of support were
particularly important where the persons conducting an investigation were
physically threatened or where it was necessary to bring pressure against
authoritarian actors (and institutional enclaves of authoritarian power such as
the military) to obtain information. The authority of the Commissions to conduct
their investigations was described in the two mandates as follows:
Table 3: Investigating powers of the Truth Commissions for Chile and EI Salvador
3.1.2 Providing a platform for the victims to tell their stories
Both Commissions conducted what they described as "open" investigations,
serving as a platform for persons to tell their stories (Rettig, 1993: 6; Salvadoran
Commission, 1993: 12). The Commissioners received public and confidential
submissions from the victims (where stil alive), their families, witnesses with
37 Buergenthal also notes that information was requested from the Government of the United
States in its capacity as the most important international supporter of the Salvadoran
government (1995: 301-303).
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information on specific events and from non-governmental human rights
organisations. According to the Salvadoran Commission, "the whole of
Salvadoran society, institutIons and individuals familiar with acts of violence
were invited to make them known to the Commission, under the guarantee of
confidentiality and discretion provided for in the agreements" (1993: 12). The
Commissions were mandated accordingly:
Table 4: Serving as a platform for the victims to tell their story
3.1.3 Making recommendations
The Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador were empowered to make
recommendations "for legislative, structural or other changes to avoid a
repetition of past abuses" (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 1995: 79). Their mandates
instructed the Commissions to:
Table 5: Recommendations of the Truth Commissions
While the Parti es to the Salvadoran Peace Accords agreed that the Commission's
recommendations were binding on all of the parties to the peace accords, el
decision to implement the recommendations of the Chilean Commission was left
to the discretion of the President:
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Table 6: The legal status of Truth Commissions' recommendations
3.1.4 Es tablis h ing accountabiliy or the ide n tit y of the perpetrators
Ensalaco writes that the Commissions for Chile and El Salvador were
"commissions for truth and reconciliation, but not ... for truth, reconciliation and
justice" (1994: 657). His observation draws attention to the fact that Truth
Commissions are not judicial bodies. Reflecting the "no prosecution" demand
made by authoritarian actors during transition, neither the Salvadoran nor the
Chilean Commission was mandated with judicial authority or purpose. It was not
within their competence, therefore, to prosecute individuals or initiate criminal
proceedings. Their respective mandates were specific on these limitations:
Table 7: Truth Commissions are not judicial bodies
The Chilean and Salvadoran Commissions were instructed to refer any evidence
of criminal wrong-doing to the proper judicial authority for further
investigation.38 Their mandates, therefore, established a relationship between the
Truth Commission process and the judicial system. Technically, this left open the
possibility that evidence gathered during their respective investigations could be
used to support criminal proceedings within the formal court system at some
point in the future.
38 Article Two of the Chilean Commission's mandate states that "if while carrying out its
function the Commission receives evidence about actions that appear criminal, it will
immediately submit it to the appropriate court" Similarly, Article Six of the Salvadoran
Commission reads "if the Commission determines that information it gathers has a judicial
purpose, "it may refer the case to the Attorney-General of the Republic ... for handling
through the judicial channel" .
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However, it is also important to note that both processes were
accompanied by amnesty laws that effectively prohibited the criminal prosecution
of persons responsible for past human rightsviolations.39 These include violations
that were either investigated by the two Commissions or ca ses that may otherwise
come to light. In both countries, former authoritarian regimes enacted self-
amnesty laws before transition; the state judged the actions of it own agents and
absolved itself of future criminal responsibility.40 The 1978 amnesty law enacted
in Chile by the Pinochet regime was accepted by the new government as a
condition of the transition process and remains in effect in 1998. The 1978
Chilean amnesty law does not prevent alleged human rights violations from being
investigated. However, due process must be suspended by the court if it
determines that the offense in question is covered under the terms of the law. In
this context, the judicial system allows investigation without the possibility of
L . 41pena sanctlOns.
Past laws in El Salvador were also accepted and then strengthened by the
inaugural regime with new laws that were enacted first as part of the initial peace
process and the n again after the Truth Commission presented its report. While
the amnesti es covered acts committed by all parties to the conflicts, the state was
the main beneficiaryas its agents committed the vast majority of the violations.
The combined effect of the "no prosecution" demand made by authoritarian
actors, the absence of judicial powers within the mandates of the two Truth
Commissions and the presence of amnesty laws was to effectively take past
human rights violations out of the realm of legal action. Even where evidence of
criminal-wrong doing was gathered during the investigation process and
presente d the court system, the presence of an amnesty law undermined the
ability of the courts to proceed with that case.
Lacking judicial powers, the Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador
had two mechanisms that potentially allowed them to establish indirect
accountability. The first was the presentation of an historical record that assigned
institutional responsibility for past violations. Second, the Salvadoran
Commission identified by name the individuals responsible for committing past
violations. While public identification is not a criminal sanction, it can have a
39 A complete summary of the Amnesty Laws enacted in Chile and El Salvador was provided in
Section 2.2.40 The legal status of self-amnesty under international law is questionable. Roht-Arriaza argues
that "such amnesties are simply a version of judging one's own case (at least by implication as
no judgment is allowed) and therefore would seem to be prohibited under general principles of
law ... forbidding self-judging" (1995: 58).
41 As of 1993 there were approximately 1,000 ca ses either pending before the court or suspended
as result of the 1978 self-amnesty. The policy of the Chilean government has been to
encourage investigations in the hope that a change in the political situation will allow for the
conclusion of criminal prosecutions at a later date (Mera, 1995: 181). However, in an event
that suggests the power of the military to impose the pact of impunity is weakening, the
Chilean Court of Appeals recently agreed to hear a charge of Genocide brought against
Augusto Pinochet by the Communist Party. It was the first time a court had accepted charges
against Pinochet. (Diebel, Linda, "Clinging to Power", Toronto Star, 10 February 1998, p.
A16).
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negative effect on the reputation, career and political and economic prospects of
the individuaL. In their report, the Commissioners argued that making the identity
of the perpetrators public was central to their mandate: "the (government and the
FMLN) made it quite clear that it was necessary that the complete truth be made
known, and that is why the Commission was established. Now, the whole truth
can not be told without naming names ... Not to name names would be to
reinforce the very impunity that the Parties instructed the Commission to put to
an end" (1993: 25).42 The Chilean Commission declined to identify individuals,
arguing that it had neither the mandate nor the resources to assure due process
for individuals that might be named. The Commission, therefore, chose to leave
the question of individual responsibility to the courts.
3.2 Responding to gross and systematic human rights
violations
If Truth Commissions are bodies established to investigate past human rights
violations, then what kind of violations cause inaugural regimes to set them up?
Human rights violations are committed in every country in the world. Where
effective mechanisms for the protection and promotion of rights exist, these
violations are likely to be isolated acts that are few in number. However, in
situations where effective mechanisms do not exist, or where violence is used by
the state to achieve policy objectives, the num ber of violations may expand to
affect the lives of large sectors of society. Truth Commissions in Chile and El
Salvador were created under the latter situation. The Commissions were not
simply a response to the fact that violations were committed, but rather that these
vialations were gross and systematic in nature.
Cecilia Medina defines gross and systematic human rights violations as
"those violations, instrumental to the achievement of government polices,
perpetrated in such a quantity and in such a manner as to create a situation in
which the rights to life, personal integrity or the personal liberty of the
population as a whole, or one or more sectors of the population, are
continuously infringed or threatened" (1990: 440). Gross and systematic
violations, therefore, are not random and disconnected acts committed by agents
of the state acting beyond their authority. Rather, they form one part of a
conscious state policy that uses violence to achieve the objectives of the
43government.
In turn, a policy of violence is facilitated by a de facto or de jure policy of
impunity that allows agents of the state to first commit the violations and then
protects them from the due process of law. The official or quasi-official status of
42 The decision to "name names" was the most controversial aspect of the Commission's report.
Buergenthal writes that the Salvadoran government launched an international campaign to
prevent the release of the names. The Commissioners were "obligated to explain our position
to government leaders in the United States, Europe and Latin America who were being lobbied
by the Salvadorans" (1995: 307).43 Pasqualucci writes that the objective of governments that "engaged in (forcedJ disappearances
and other such gross and systematic human rights violations was to sow intimidation, making
society as a whole the victim of those violations (1994: 326).
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the perpetrators shields them from sanctions, creating a culture of impunity in
which acts of violent repression can be carried out without fear of repercussions.
Gross and systematic human rights violations, therefore, occur in countries that
are characterised "by an absence or lack of effective national mechanisms for the
protection of human rights and the lack of co-operation on the part of the
governments concerned" (Medina, 1990: 440):4
In this context, a transition from authoritarian rule necessarily involves
efforts to establish and promote the rule of law, including holding the
perpetrators of past violations responsible for their actions. A situation of
continued lawlessness "serves to disempower ordinary citizens, making them
fearful to think or speak out and breeding cynicism ...". As societies undergo
transition, "one of the first opportunities to re-establish the primacy of the rule of
law comes in the treatment of the former rulers, torturers and jailers" (Roht-
Arriaza, 1995: 4). It was in this effort to deal with the past and establish the new
principles on which governance would be based that Truth Commissions were
convened in Chile and El Salvador.
3.2.1 State sponsored violence in Chile and EI Salvador: The enemy
is anyone not on the list of friends
Authoritarian regimes in Chile and El Salvador committed human rights
violations that can be characterised as gross and systematic under Medina's
definition. The institutions and resources of the state were organised to physically
carry out the violence and national human rights mechanisms failed to protect the
victims. In this environment, the Doctrine of National Security was the most
significant epistemic construct shaping relations between the state and civil
society in Chile and El Salvador during their respective periods of dictatorship.
The Doctrine provided an ideological rationale to justify the interests and actions
of authoritarian actors before national society and the international community.
While its political expression was more coherent under the Pinochet regime in
Chile (Rettig: 1995: 120-121), the Doctrine also served as a conceptual
framework for counter-insurgency warfare conducted by the Salvadoran state
against both the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the
governments other opponents in civil society (Salvadoran Commission, 1993:
13 ).45
The logic of the Doctrine of National Security was rooted in East-West
competition that occurred during the Cold War. Ronald Steel writes that the
polarisation of the international polit Y caused by the Cold War transformed the
concept of "defence" by altering the political and geographic parameters of
"national security". For the United States and the former Soviet Union, the effect
was to expand those parameters. Steel argues that "unlike the term defence,
44 The Truth Commission for Honduras uses a similar definition. It found that "the fundamental
defining characteristic of forced disappearances is that each individual case forms part of a
deliberate and conscious policy. Further, this policy is adopted by the government at a level of
authority (that hasj the capacity not only to issue the order to disappear a person and assure
its completion, but also to guarantee the impunity of those who execute the order" (1994: 3 l.
45 The Salvadoran Commission refers to the "doctrine of national salvation" (1993: 13)
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which connotes repelling an invading force, (the new understanding of national
security) suggests not just resistance to aggression but an outward reach to
anticipate and neutralize dangers that might still only be potential" (1997: 2).
Ste el continues that this definition drew a new security parameter that was
determined "by the reach of national power ... a regional power will have a
regional security parameter; a global power will be satisfied with nothing less
than a global one" (ibid: 2).
The new enemy had two faces; a physically bound nation state and an
ideology that existed in the non-physical realm of ideas. Countries were at once
vulnerable to both a military assault and an ideological infiltration from which
there was no traditional military defence. The concept of security, therefore, was
"unhinged from its geographic moorings and became a function of power and an
aspect of psychology" (ibid: 2). For the United States, "noplace seemed to be
really secure. Where there were not Soviet legions there were communist
believers, or sympathizers, enemies within and enemies without" (ibid: 2). As a
power with a global reach. the United States responded by adopting the Truman
Doctrine, declaring that the national security of the U.S. was at stake anytime a
"free" (anti-Communist) country was threatened with a communist take-over or
by communist influence.
As minor powers, Latin American countries did not expand their security
parameters outward to eng age in bi-polar conflict at the international leveL.
Rather, the Cold War tended to internalise those parameters with ideology and
the psychological dimensions of insecurity playing a particularly important role.
The Cold War coincided with a surge of national level social activism
throughout the region. Legally constituted social organisations and armed
revolutionary movements appeared advocating sweeping changes to Latin
America's closed political systems and the unequal economic distribution within
countries. Traditional elites were unable to control popular dissent using legal
means and turned instead to violent repression. Garretón writes that a high
degree of polarisation existed between "the active and mobilised popular
sectors... and the dominant sector who saw this situation as catastrophic, a zero-
sum political crisis where everything was at stake". Perceiving their interests to be
threatened, the military and its civilian allies attempted to "disarticulate the
former society" by destroying the social structures that challenged them. "The
touch sto ne of this reactive logic was repression whereby the regime relied on a
powerful (state and military) apparatus that employed vast ... resources and
unprecedented techniques of brutality" (ibid: 15).
Within this context, the Doctrine of National Security "provided an all
encompassing ideological framework for military regimes" (Donnelly, 1993: 45).
Its basic characteristic was that the Doctrine placed national level disputes into
the context of bi-polar international conflict. 46 Demands for reforms arising from
46 According to the Chilean Commission, "starting in the 1950s, Chile, like many countries in
Latin Ainerica, witnessed the insertion of its domestic politics into the superpower struggle,
which, given the impetus of contending interests and ideologies ... entailed polarisation of
Chilean society... the Cold War pitted Cuban-Soviet insurgency against North American
counterinsurgency each with its own allies - throughout Latin America" (1993: 48).
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national level circumstances were denounced by the elites as part of a large r
international communist ideological and military conspiracy. In turn, the national
actors advocating change were identified as the agents of that conspiracy. The
principle enemy of the state, therefore, became large sectors of its own citizenry
that did not conform to the dominant values and interests. Those persons and
organizations became the targets of state repression by virtue of their dissent,
creating an environment in which gross and systematic human rights violations
could be justified by authoritarian actors in the name of defending the state from
"communist subversion" (Donnelly, 1993: 44-45).
An additional factor contributing to gross and systematic human rights
violations in Chile and El Salvador was the role of the military within a National
Security state. The Doctrine viewed the state as the central institution in society.
In turn, the military was the central institution of that state with the
responsibility for protecting the nation's values and its "transcendent permanent
interests" (Donnelly, 1993: 44-45). Brian Loveman argues that the military
assumed the role of the "guarantor of the institutional order and, by implication
adjudicator of the national common good, permanent interests and national
security requirements" (1994: 110).
The notion of "guardianship" placed the military above elected politics
and set limits on the scope of legal activity "premised on the notion that people
needed to be protected from themselves and from any organisations (and
ideologies, external influences or otherwise) which might subvert the existing
politicalorder" (ibid: 111).47 In assuming this role, and in the a bsence of other
institutions and forces in society capable ofrestraining their power, extreme acts
of repression could be justified by invoking "national security" and the well-
being of the state in the face of an international ideological enemy working
through national actors.
3.2.2 A legacy of gross and systematie human rights vialations
The human rights records of authoritarian regimes in El Salvador and Chile
illustrates what happened when social conflict is managed through a National
Security Doctrine perspective. Regarding the former country, violations were
committed in the context of large-scale civil war. Over 80,000 persons died
during the twelve year Salvadoran conflict. Beyond extra-judicial killings, the use
of intimidation, arbitrary arrest and detention and other forms of violations were
also pervasive. For example, Human Rights Watch reported that the Salvadoran
army and security forces commonly used "asphyxiation, simulated drowning,
drugging, application of electric shocks and sexual violence in the course of
interrogating detainees." These practices of ten lead to the death of the victim
(1990: 7). As a result, "terror and distrust reigned among the civilian
population" (Salvadoran Commission, 1993: 27).
47 The Chilean Commission reported that "the justification for the military's use of force against
non-conforming groups in society "was a distorted concept of national security, which as a
supreme va lue was regarded as being above ethics. This amounted to the revival of what used
to be called raison detre: once again ... the rights of the individual could be violated by reason
of a general interest" (1993: 61).
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Some of the best empirical information on human rights violations can be
taken from the reports of the Truth Commissions themselves. Reflecting the scale
of the violence, the Commission for El Salvador received over 22,000 complaints
of human rights violations. It described this number as a "significant sample (but
one) that does not cover every act of violence" (ibid: 43). Furthermore, the
Commission's investigation clearly demonstrated that the state was the principle
perpetrator of human rights in El Salvador. Only five percent of the complaints
received by the Salvadoran Truth Commission were attributed to the FMLN.48 In
contrast, eighty-five percent of the complaints corresponded to either agents of
the Salvadoran state or paramilitary groups associated with it (ibid: 43). On this
basis, the Commission concluded that "repeated human rights violations had
been committed by members of the armed forces (acting) under the protection of
the State but outside of the rule of law" (ibid: 10). In addition, an unrelated ad
hoccommission set up by the Salvadoran government in 1992 to investigate the
human rights performance of the military charged 110 senior officers with serious
human rights violations and called for their dismissal from the service. The list
included the Minister of Defense, his Vice-minister and the Chief of the General
Staff (Golden, 25 October 1992).49
The state's use of violence was systematic and responded to the
Salvadoran regime's political objective of physically eliminating perceived
enemies. The complaints made against the military "indicate(d) that this violence
originated in a political mind set that viewed political opponents as subversives
and enemies. Anyone who expressed views that differed from the government line
ran the risk of being eliminated as if they were armed enemies in the field of
battle ... any organisation in a position to promote opposing ideas that
questioned official policy was automatically labelled as working for the guerrillas
.,. and branded as subversive" (1993: 43). In this polarised environment, the
objective of the military and its civilian allies was to "fragment" opposition
groups by means of a campaign of "arbitrary arrests, murders and selective and
indiscriminate disappearances of leaders" (ibid: 27). The violence, therefore,
became "a succession of indiscriminate attacks on the non-combatant civilian
48 Only 800 of the 22,000 complaints of human rights violations received by the Commission
were made against the FMLN (1993: 44). Salvadoran Commissioner Thomas Buergenthal
writes that "despite the massive wartime propaganda to the contrary, the government side had
committed a substantially larger number of egregious acts than the FMLN. Moreover, some of
these acts (such as the massacre of civilians in rural areas) had no comparable counterpart
among the crimes committed by the FMLN". According to Buergenthal, FMLN vialations
included the extra-judicial kiling of local government officials, forced recruitment, abductions
and the placing of landmines in civilian areas (1995: 313-314). Examples of these violations
are reported in the Salvadoran Commission's report (1993: 148-170).49 The ad hoc commission was established as part of the peace proeess to exclusively investigate
the Salvadoran military. It presented its report only three months after the Truth Commission
began its own investigation. While the report has never been made public, some the
information on its findings leaked into the North American press (NYT, 25 October 1992).
Buergenthal concludes that the ad hoc commission had a significant impact as "it was the first
real signal that the days of business as usual, of military impunity and cover ups, might be
over" (1995:304).
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population and also collective summary executions, particularly against the rural
population" (ibid: 27).
Consequently, the majority of the victims were unarmed civilians kiled by
agents of the Salvadoran state outside of combat situations. These persons were
targets for repression as a result of their political affiliation or activism, real or
suspected. Persons living in rural areas were particularly affected. During the
1980s, the Salvadoran military perpetrated numerous massacres of civilians with
the intention of dep riving the FMLN of its base of support in areas that it either
controlled or sought to control. The civilian population "in disputed or (FMLN)
controlled zones was automatically assumed to be the enemy" and, therefore,
they became "legitimate targets for attack" (ibid: 13).
In Chile, Zalaquett describes the Pinochet dictatorship as "an intense
period of political repression which resulted in political kilings and
disappearances, the imprisonment or exile of countless Chileans and the
widespread use of torture" (1993: xxiv). The Chilean Commission received over
4,000 complaints and documented 2,279 cases of politically motivated extra-
judicial kilings and disappearances occurring between 1973 and 1990 (1995:
126). It also concluded that the incidence of other forms of violations such as
arbitrary arrest and detention was widespread. In particular, the use of tortur e to
obtain information during interrogations was "universal" and "systematic" (ibid:
136).50 At least 20,000 people were also forced to leave the country for political
reasons (ibid: 139).
As in El Salvador, the Chilean state was primarily responsible for human
rights violations. The Commission concluded that only 30 of the almost 2,000
persons that die d as a result of violations were members of the armed forces (ibid:
11 9).51 This constitutes less than two percent of the total number of victims. The
remaining persons were mostly civilians kiled by members of the security forces
or civilians acting with their support.
Chile did not suffer from a prolonged cIvil war on the same large scale as
El Salvador. The regime of General Pinochet justified military rule by claiming
that the country was in a situation of civil war. Repressive actions were explained
with the argument that "counterinsurgency must confront guerrila warfare with
its own methods lest it place itself at a disadvantage ..." (Rettig, 1993: 61).
However, the Commission determined that no such state of internal war existed,
either at the time of the 1973 coup staged by Pinochet or at any point during the
regime's term in power. There wereno "effective" armed opposition groups and
the army "faced no organized rebel troops" (Rettig, 1995: 119). In addition,
there were few instances of armed conflict between the military and opposition
groups. In the absence of civil war, human rights violations in Chile were
committed more selectively and directly affected a smaller segment of the
population than in El Salvador.
50 A Lutheran Bishop was told by Pinochet in 1974 that "you have to torture Marxists and
Communists or else they won't sing" (Handelman, 1998).51 The reports of non-governmental human rights organisations make few or no references to
violations committed by opposition groups (Amnesty International, 1985; 1988).
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Despite the more selective nature of the violence, human rights violations
in Chile were also systematic in nature, reflecting the expressly political intentions
of the government (Rettig, 1995: 121-122). Acts of violence were planned and
co-ordinated by a gro up of officers "acting in secret ... that had aremarkable
ideological coherence and initiative and that hada decisive impact on the
problem of human rights" (ibid: 121). Human rights violations, therefore,
"responded to a pattern of prior planning and central organization (by the state)
that reveals a resolve to exterminate certain categories of persons: those
considered politically dangerous" (ibid: 132).
The Chilean Commission found that "the majority of the deaths
(occurring during the period between 1973 and 1978) were the result of actions
taken against officials of the deposed regime (of former President Salvador
Allende)" (ibid: 128). Members of left of centre political parties continued to be
targeted after 1978 as "these organisations were the most tangible enemy" (ibid:
141). "Destroying political parties meant physically eliminating the activists who
made such an organisation possible. According to that logic, those who by their
training and experience ... their position in the party, and their personal qualities
of education, training, persistence, orphysical courage were seen as dangerous
(by the government) and beyond redemption, and had to be physically
eliminated" (1993: 497). SocIal organisations that later appeared to oppose the
dictatorship were also subjected to repression (Rettig: 1995: 141; Lowden, 1996:
1-9; Zalaquett, 1993: xxvii).
3.2.3 Impunity and the failure of national human rights and
judicial mechanisms
As noted by Medina, gross and systematic human rights violations committed on
the scale witnessed in Chile and El Salvador required a de facto or de jure policy
of impunity (1990: 440), which is defined as "exemption from punishment or
from injury as the consequence of an act" .52 According to the United Nations
Rapporteur on Impunity, Louis Joinet, the term "covers all the measures and
practices whereby, on the one hand, states fail in their obligations to investigate,
try and sentence those responsible for violations of human rights and, on the
other hand, impede the enjoyment by victims and their families to know the truth
and have their rights restored" (IDOC, 1997: 3).
Countries where gross and systematic human rights violations occur with
impunity are by definition "lawless socIeties" (Roht-Arriaza, 1995: 4). A
situation of impunity implies that there are no effective sanctions under law to
deter state institutions or their agents from committing violations. In this regard,
the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, writes that "impunity
... represents one of the most serious hindrances to the curbing of human rights
abuses. A country lacking a system guaranteeing a minimum of justice and
respect for human dignity wil inevitably risk jeopardising its development effort
and increase the risk of falling prey to intern al or external conflicts" (1997: 9).
52 Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Sixth Edition, p.542.
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Impunity had three attributes within Medina's definition of gross and
systematic violations as these were committed in Chile and El Salvador. First,
there were few instances in either country where the persons responsible for
human rights violations were brought to justice through the due process of law
(Loveman, 1994; McSherry, 1992; Pascualucci, 1995; Roht-Arriaza, 1995:
Mendez, 1997; IDOC, 1997). In Chile, only "in very exceptional cases, violations
were not investigated by the courts and their authors were not legally punished"
(Rettig, 1993: 126). Similarly, "civilian and military groups (in El Salvador)
engaged in a systematic mur der campaign with total impunity" (Salvadoran
Commission, 1993: 27) that the Salvadoran Commission described as
"institutionalised" in the structure of the state (1993: 10). As the conflict
escalated during the 1980s; "certain elements of society found themselves
immune from any governmental or political constraints and thus forged for
themselves the most abject impunity .... within the military establishment and in
contradiction with its real purpose and mandate, impunity vis-à-vis the civilian
authorities became the rule" (ibid: 173).
Second, the use of violence to achieve government objectives required a de
facto state policy of impunity. The Chilean Commission reported that "to
undertake human rights violations, (agents of the state) had absolute certainty of
impunity" (1995: 140). The report of the Salvador Commission also concluded
that the military committed violations "under the protection of state bodies while
outside the law" (1993: 10). Third, a situation of impunity was possible as a
result of the absence of effective mechanisms for the protection and promotion of
human rights. On this point, both Commissions concluded that while extensive
guarantees existed under nationallaw and international conventions to which the
countries were signatories, the state failed to respect and enforce those
guarantees.
They were particularly critical of the role of the judiciary and law
enforcement agencies.53 The Salvadoran Commission reported that "none of the
three branches of Government - judicial, legislative or executive - was capable of
restraining the military's overwhelming control of society. The judiciary was
weakened as it fell victim to intimidation ... it never enjoyed genuine institutional
independence (and) its ineffectiveness steadily increased until it became, through
its inaction or its appalling submissiveness, a factor which contributed to the
suffering by the country" (1993: 172). The Commission added that "the glar ing
deficiencies (of the judiciary) were a prime cause of the occurrence and systematic
repetition of extremely grave human rights violations" (ibid: 175). These
53 The failure of the judiciary to enforce human rights norms is a situation frequently identified
by Truth Commissions. For example, the Commission for South Africa described its hearings
on the judiciary and the legal profession as "the most important after those dealing with
human rights abuses". Testimony heard by the South African Commission charged that "the
judiciary upheld every aspect of apartheid ... they punished opponents of their system- for
theirs it was- with the harshest array of cruelty, and yet even now they manage to preserve
and propagate the absurd it y that they were somehow above it all- impartial" ("Apartheid
judges snu b truth commission" in the Guardian Weekly, 2 November 1997, p.l).
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deficiencies were determined to be so serious that the Commission called on the
Supreme Court to resign (ibid: 175).54
The Chilean Commission came to a similar conclusion. Its investigation
revealed that "the Judiciary did not react with sufficient energy regarding
violations of human rights" (Rettig, 1995: 124). The Commissioners argued that
the judiciary retained a degree of independence during the Pinochet regime that
would have "allowed it to assume a more resolute attitude in the defence of
human rights" (ibid: 125). However, they concluded that "while the court system
continued to operate normally in almost all of the realms of national activity ...
legal oversight was glaringly insufficient with respect to the personal rights that
were being violated by the government to an unprecedented extent" (ibid: 118).
In this context, "the attitude of the judiciary produced, in important measure, an
intensification in the process of systematic human rights violations ... The
Commission believes that if the courts had respected their constitutional mandate
to act ... the n death, disappearance and torture could have been pre vente d in
many cases and, moreover, the perpetrators would have been put on notice that
their actions were rejected by at lea st one of the powers of the state, which could
eventually punish them" (ibid: 119-120).
3.3 Responding to a legacy of gross and systematic
human rights violations: The responsibilties of the
inaugural regimes
The Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador were established as a direct
response to the political imperatives resulting from a situation of gross and
systematic violations. The two inaugural regimes were confronted by widely held
demands in national society and the international community that past violations
be investigated, that the persons responsible be held accountable for their actions
and that the state offer some form of remedy and compensation to the victims.55
As memories of the violence were stil fresh in people's minds, trying to simply
bury the past during transition might have proven both ethically and politically
unacceptable to the majority of the population. In this context, Truth
Commissions were required to establish the credibility of the new governments by
providing a forum to confront the state's legacy of violations and giving at least
the appearance that action was being taken. This political imperative was
reflected in the mandates of the Commissions for Chile and El Salvador:
54 Commission member Thomas Buergenthal later described the Salvadoran judiciary as
"corrupt, inefficient, and incapable of rendering impartial judgments in so-called political
cases" (1995: 308).55 Buergenthal writes that the FMLN had no confidence in the Salvadoran justice system. "In
fact, one of the FMLN's main negotiating objectives was a thorough reform of the justice
system. It considered such action a necessary to protect FMLN (membersJ against potential
governments abuses once the FMLN la id down its arms" (1995: 296). Accordingly, a special
body to investigate the past andpropose such reforms was required.
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Table 8: Commissions respond to the political imperatives of transition
The second imperative that compelled the inaugural regimes in Chile and El
Salvador to establish Truth Commissions was legal; a result of the emergence of
international human rights norms and the "unbundling of territory" as described
by Ruggie in Section 2.3. Brian Walsh argues that the inaugural regimes were
guided by the "doctrine of state responsibility (that is) widely recognised in
customary internationallaw". The doctrine asserts that "regardless of who leads
the government (at a particular moment), the state has a duty to compensate
victims for breaches of state obligations .... The state remains lia ble regardless of
changes to its leadership" (1996: 114). Under law, therefore, the state is
understood as a permanent and enduring entity that transcends the existence of
any single government. It must assume responsibility for the actions of all of the
governments that represent it over time, making the Chilean and Salvadoran
states liable for the actions of past authoritarian regimes even though political
transitions had occurred.
State obligations related to the protection and promotion of human rights
were clearly defined under national and internationallaw. Regarding the latter,
rights become a dimension of the international polit Y when they are
institutionalised in the form of legal instruments, such as the treaties, covenants
and conventions found under the jurisdiction of the United Nations or the
Organisation of American States. The instruments confirm that certain rights are
so fundamental that they can not be suspended or subject to derogation, even
during armed conflict or in emergency sItuations where the national security is
deemed to be threatened. These "core rights" are related to the most fundamental
dimensions of human survival and physical integrity. They are violated when
states commit acts that result in extra-judicial killings, torture, disappearances
and prolonged arbitrary arrest as occurred with systematic regularity in El
Salvador and Chile (Mendez, 1997: 260; Buergenthal, 1995: 312; Pasqualucci,
1994: 329-333). Even where states do not ratify an instrument, their actions may
be judged against its norms to the extent that these are interpreted as the
minimum international standards guiding state practices.
All States Parties also have an obligation to comply in good faith with the
terms of the instruments to which they are a signatory. Quoting Article 26 of the
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Pasqualucci argues "the doctrine of
pacta sunt servida provides that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith" . In turn, the infrastructure
created to service international instruments constitutes a network of formal
channels through which complaints of human rights violations can be made and
governments held accountable before internationallaw and public opinion where
these obligations are not met (Marks, 1993: 296-299).56 Compliance further
demands that signatory nations harmonise nationallaws, policies and practices to
be consistent with their obligations as defined by the instrument (Pasqualucci
1994: 329). In this regard, internationallaw works to shape national level legal
regimes.
Beyond defining obligations, international human right instruments also
provide clear directions to States Parties regarding the manner in which past
violations must be resolved. Considering the doctrine of state responsibility and
their obligations under international law, there is an emerging legal argument
that states have a positive obligation to respond to situations of past gross and
systematic violations (Mendez, 1997: 259; Pasqualucci, 1994: 29-330; Roht-
Arriaza, 1990: 449). It is important to note that this positive obligation to
prosecute past violations is proactive and distinct from the negative obligation to
simply prevent them. In turn, any investigation into past violations must be
conducted in good faith rather than as "rituals preordained to be ineffective"
(Mendez, 1997: 260). Mendez further argues that trends in law and practice
create four essential obligations on states that are parties to international
agreements. In turn, these obligations create Jour corresponding rights (ibid:
261):
Table 9: State obligations and responsibilities under international law
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56 The poor human rights performance of countries around the world indicates that a large
distance continues to exist between formalobligations and actual compliance of governments
with those obligations. In this regard, it could be argued that rights are universal in their
rhetoric only. However, Marks argues that international norms still provide a broadly
recognised minimum standard against which actions can be judged "to hold governments
accountable (and) point out the gap between word and deed" (Marks, 1993: 296).
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Particularly important is what Hayner, (1994), Pasqualucci (1994),
Mendez (1997), Roht-Arriaza (1990; 1995) and Carver (1990) refer to as "the
right to know the truth" . All four scholars argue that inherent in the obligation
to investigate human rights violations and punish the perpetrators is the right of
the public to know the results of such a process. Citing Carver, Hayner observes
that the "right to truth" is guaranteed in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which confers the right "to know the truth" and to "seek,
receive and impart information" (1994: 611). Similarly,Ensalaco writes that the
normative basis for making information on violations public is found in Protocol
One of the Geneva Conventions which defines the "rights of families to know the
fate of their members". Ensalaco finds a similar precedent in the Convention on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment that
obligates States Parties to "conduct a preliminary investigation" into alleged cases
of abuse and make the information public (1994: 671).
3.3.1 Providing the normative basis for Truth Commissions
Beyond compelling inaugural regimes to establish Truth Commissions, State
human rights obligations under international law provided the normative and
ethical framework for the Commissions' work. Both bodies bega n their
investigations by determining that Chile and El Salvador had signed international
instruments before and during the period they were mandated to investigate. The
terms of the se instruments were judged to be in force and, therefore, defined state
obligations that were binding on the formerregimes during the respective periods
of conflict:
Table 10: State human rights obligations under international law
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The existence of common international standards was particularly important
when addressing conflicting claims to history and the legitimacy of the state's
recourse to violent action against its own citizens. Neither the Chilean nor the
Salvadoran military denied that they had committed some violations during the
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past conflicts. However, both claimed that a state of war existed, reqUlring
dramatic military action and the suspension of certain individual human rights in
the name of national security. This attitude was reflected in the Chilean military's
claim that it is "naÏve to expect certain (human rights) norms to be observed in a
situation of war or other disturbance" (Rettig, 1993: p.33).
However, as noted in Chapter Two, international law prohibits any
suspensionor derogation of certain fundamental rights, even in conflct
situations. Accordingly, the Salvadoran Commission concluded that "it is
important to classify the seriousness of each act of violence on the basis of rights
which the... instruments list as not being subject to derogation, in particular,
rights directly related to the right to life and to physical integrity. As aresult,
neither the Salvadoran State nor persons acting on its behalf or in its place can
claim that the existence of an armed conflict justified the commission of serious
acts of violence in contravention of one or other of the international human
rights treaties applicable" (1993: 22).
The Chilean Commission also reported that "a situation of internal war
does not constitute the slightest justification or excuse for the violation of legal
and ethical norms that are absolute ..." (Rettig, 1993: p~32). Referring to Chile's
obligations under International Humanitarian Law, the Commission concluded
these conventions also constituted part of "the essence of Chilean law" and that
"such transgressions (as were committed by the Pinochet regime) are never
justified" (ibid: 29). On this basis, both private cItizens and the state could be
held accountable for their actions.
3.3.2 De fin ing violations
From determining that the state was obligated to meet its international
commitments, the common language of international norms was then used by the
two Commissions as a basis for defining the forms of human rights violations
falling within the scope of their mandates.57 In Chile, the term "most serious
violations" specified in Article One of the Commission's mandate was determined
to include "the situations of those persons who disappeared after arrest, who
were executed, or were tortured to death in which the moral responsibility of the
state is compromised by acts of its agents or persons in (the state's) service". The
Commission based this definition on Chile's obligations under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Rettig, 1993: 27) and international humanitarian
law as embodied in the Geneva Conventions (ibid:29).58
57 Some basic sources of international human rights used by the Truth Commissions include the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, of which the United Nations Human Rights Committee is the authoritative interpreter,
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the
Geneva Conventions. Within the Inter-american human rights system, particularly relevant are
the American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-american Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons.
58 It is important to note that the definition of "most serious violations" did not include those
acts not resulting in the death of the victim, such as torture, arbitrary arrest and intimidation.
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The Salvadoran Commission also concluded that the normative basis of its
investigation would be "determined by the rules of international law (which)
must be considered as providing the basis for the criteria applicable to the
functions which the peace agreement entrusted to the Commission" (1993: 20).
Its mandate instructed the Commission to investigate "serious acts of violence".
While the mandate did not specify what principles of law the Commission should
draw on in defining these acts, the Commissioners themselves concluded that the
concept of "serious acts of violence does not exist in a normative vacuum and
must be analyzed on the basis of certain relevant principles of law" (ibid: 20).
They referred to Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which defines the fundamental rights not subject to derogation, such as
the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment (ibid: 21). The Commissioners also argued that the violation
of the se fundamental rights "may even constitute an international crime in
situations where acts are of a consistent type or reflect a systematic practice
whose purpose is the large scale violation of rights ..." (ibid: 21).
The role of non-state actors in supporting Truth
Commissions
A final dimension of the "unbundling of territory" relevant to the Truth
Commissions was the role of non-state actors. They worked in El Salvador and
Chile to place the issue of human rights at the center of the public debate around
political transition. Using national and international norms, non-state actors also
contributed towards creating a political environment in which inaugural regimes
were forced to confront the issue of rights, including supporting the evolution of
an ethical environment in which the values associated with "human rights
become the moral counterweight to the force of the military dictatorship"; a
framework for "imagining" an alternative to authoritarian governance
(Zalaquett, 1993: xxvi). In their turn, the Truth Commissions for Chile and El
Salvador provided a political space for non-state actors to enter in to the
transition process.
For the purpose of this paper, non-state actors are defined as
organisations and individuals that exist outside the state's formal structure. Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) influence the human rights policy of states
by monitoring state performance and advocating for the protection and
promotion of rights before public opinion and through the formal channels
established by national and international mechanisms. NGOs also work at the
international leve! to promote the development of international legal standards
and specific instruments for enforcing state compliance with those standards. In
this manner, non-state actors play a significant role in the evolution of
international human rights norms, including the extension of those norms into
the national context.59
3.3.3
59 One recent example is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and Their Destruction. The International
Campaign to Ban Landmines played a decisive ro le in stigmatising the weapons in
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The extent to which human rights organisations are active II the
international realm is demonstrated by arecent survey of 300 NGOs (Smith,
1997). The survey found that NGO activity around human rights has increased
dramatically in the past two decades. A full seventy-five percent of the responding
organisations were created after 1970 (ibid: 3). In addition, the large majority of
these organisations are active at the international leveL. Ninety-three percent
reported that they work to "promote the development of international (human
rights) legal standards" while 84 percent "promoted the development of specific
international mechanisms for enforcing human rights" (ibid: 4).60 In addition,
ninety percent of the responding organisations reported that they had contact
with the various UN human rights bodies (ibid: 10). Finally, the survey also
demonstrates the extent to which NGOs work collectively at the international
leveL. Eighty percent reported that they worked closely with other NGOs in some
form of network or coalition, indicating that there are "fairly extensive contacts
between international human rights NGOs and other NGOs working at the local,
national and internationalleveis" (ibid: 14).
NGOs played important but distinct roles in both the respective transition
and Truth Commission processes. In Chile, the Truth Commission was
dominated by national actors and the role played by international actors was not
decisive. Zalaquett argues that human rights was the central issue of political
transition as a direct result of the work of NGOs. National organisations worked
throughout the 1980s to define the issues and shape public opinion in a manner
that stigmatised the state's arbitrary use of power. They "carefully documented
every case which came to their attention and produced numerous and thorough
reports on the overall human rights situation" (1993: xxvii). This information
was used extensively by the Commission (ibid: xxvii). At the same time,
international organisations kept the issue of violations in Chile before
international public opinion (Zalaquett, 1993: xxvii; Lowden, 1996: 1-10).
In contrast, the ro le of the international community in El Salvador was
critical to the overall peace process, including the Truth Commission which
constituted one of its dimensions. Regarding the ro le of NGOs, Commission
member Buergenthal observed that national NGOs were "surprisingly
unprepared to assist the Commission (despite) their important and courageous
work during the armed conflict". He described the information provided by these
groups as "not particularly useful". However, international organisations such as
Amnesty International and Americas Watch monitored the country from the
beginning of the conflict, accumulating extensive information on the country over
the years. NGO reports "provided useful background information and serve d as
guideposts for Commission investigations" (1995: 302).61
international public opinion and genera ting political wil for the evolution and ratification of
the Convention, winning the Nobel Peace Prize for its actions.60 The four major activities reported by NGOs were "education, standard setting, monitoring
compliance with international standards and enforcement" (Smith, 1997: 9).61 Much of the information used by international organisations was originally gathered and
investigated by national organisations.
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The United Nations played a critical role in brokering and verifying the
peace accords between the government and the FMLN. The participation of the
UN was decIsive in the absence of national actors or institutions capable of
guaranteeing the implementation of the accords. As a neutral third party, the UN
Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) inserted itself between the former
combatants to monitor the implementation of the agreement and the compliance
of the respective parties. ONUSAL had a "pacifying effect on the country (during
the implementation of the peace accords). It kept the combatants and their
supporters apart, it defused dangerous situations and gave both sides a sense of
relative security" (Buergenthal, 1995: 323). In this regard, the UN presence was
essential in creating the political and socIal climate for transition.
Buergenthal also notes that the presence of ONUSAL in El Salvador was
essential to the practical functioning of the Commission. He concludes that the
role of the UN mission in establishing the minimum social and political
guarantees for both sides was essential to the Commission's ability to conduct an
investigation. AIso, ONUSAL provided logistical support "without which it
would have been impossible for the Commission to establish itself without a
significant loss of time" (ibid: 323).
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4 Dismantlingenclaves of authortiarian power;
the role of truth commissions
From their basis in national and international human rights la w, the Truth
Commissions for Chile and El Salvador had the potential to act against some, but
not all, of the enclaves of authoritarian power stil present in the transition polity.
The interaction between the Commissions and these enclaves had the potential to
take place in three sites of transition identified by John Gerard Ruggie; the sites
of Material Environments, Strategic Behaviour and Social Epistemes.
4.1 Truth Commissions and transition in material
environments
As a result of their human rights focus, the Truth Commissions for Chile and El
Salvador did not have the ability to dismantle enclaves of authoritarian power
that existed within transitional economic structures. These include enclaves that
may have been transferred into the transitional polit Y through the pact of
economic continuity. The respective Commissions could indirectly open space in
the formal political system, allowing for broa der participation in decision making
related to economic policy. However, their mandates make no reference to
economic reforms. Enclaves existing in the realm of material environments,
therefore, must to be the object of action by other transitional initiatives.
Given the inter-relationship between different aspects of transition, a
failure to accomplish the two fundamental tasks of transition in the site of
material environments undermines the process of democratic consolidation in the
sites of social epistemes and strategic behaviour. On this point, Vilas (1996:
462), Karl (1996: 77) and Garretón (1995: 147) warn that transition in Latin
America has been limited to the formal dimensions of the political system, largely
ignoring the polity's substantive aspects. The situation is particularly difficult in
Central America, where the "socio-economic conditions that precipitated
(conflict) remain virtually unchanged, and indeed in some respects are more
pressing than three decades ago" (Vilas, 1996: 464).
In El Salvador, Boyce (1995) and de Soto and del Castillo (1994) argue
that the economic policies of the Salvadoran government, supported by the
international community, conflict with the needs of the peace accords. The
political and social reforms negotiated by the government and the FLMN called
for large state expenditures to fund the reintegration of ex-combatants into
society, land transfer programmes and poverty alleviation and infrastructure
projects. These were key elements of the peace process"aimed at eliminating the
causes that initially lead to the conflict" (De Soto and del Castillo, 1994: 70).62
62 In particular, the transfer of land to ex-FMLN combatants was seen as crucial to their re-
integration into Salvadoran society, effectively representing a "land-for-arms" exchange (de
Soto and del Castillo, 1994: 70)
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Many of the initiatives have been funded by international donors as part of their
commitment to the overall peace process.
At the same time, the Salvadoran government has implemented "a
rigorous economic stabilization and structural adjustment program" which was
adopted in the mid-1980s and supported, if not required, during transition by the
International Monetary Fund (ibid: 70). However, de Soto and del Castilo note
that the current economic policies did not take in to account the full costs of
political transition, including both its social dimensions as well as rehabilitating
the country's economic infrastructure. The policies dramatically reduced
resources available to fund peace-related initiatives. Consequently, the
Salvadoran government is now faced with a dilemma; "should it sacrifice
economic stabilization to proceed with implementing the peace accords, or
should it strictly carry out economic stabilization and structural adjustment
programs, perhaps endangering peace?" (ibid: 71).
Accordingly, Boyce notes that economic policy has failed to exercise a
"peace conditionality"; it has not been used to en sure the implementation of
high-priority peace-related programmes or to mobilize domestic resources for
that purpose. Rather, the priorities of the international community and the
Salvadoran state have "of ten diverged from those of the peace accords" (Boyce,
1995: 2101). Similarly, de Soto and del Castillo maintain that costs associated
with the peace agreements can not be avoided without compromising the entire
process. They write that these two contradictory aspects of government and
international policy "could be on a collision course" (1994: 70).
The site of material environments, therefore, demonstrates that Truth
Commissions must be understood as only one aspect of a larger transition policy.
Where economic reforms fail to meet the demands of transition, the entire process
may be undermined. The activities of Commissions must be coordinated with
other initiatives that support democratic consolidation in the dimensìons of
transition that are beyond a Commission's reach. A Truth Commission process
can not be seen as a substitute for these other actions.
4.2 Truth Commissions and transition in the realm of
strategic behaviour
The ability to commit gross and systematic human rights violations required that
few institutional constraints be placed on the arbitrary use of state power in Chile
and El Salvador. Rather, Chapter Two illustrated how the resources and
institutions of the state were organised to implement the two governments'
policies of violence. The matrix of constraints and opportunities, therefore,
favoured actors with the coercive power to con tro L the political system through
the use of repression and fear.
Democratic consolidation demands that enclaves of authoritarian power
existing in the institutions of state be dismantled during transition and replaced
with democratic institutions. In this manner, transition reduces the possibility
that state power can be used arbitrarily in the future. Where they accomplish
these two goals, Truth Commissions serve as a first step towards establishing (or
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re-establishing) the rule of law and mechanisms for the protection and promotion
of human rights.
The Commissions for Chile and El Salvador had the potential to alter the
matrix of constraints and opportunities through their third objective of making
"recommendations for legislative, structural or other changes to avoid a
repetition of past abuses" (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 1995: 79). The Chilean and
Salvadoran Commissions differ in the emphasis of their recommendations. In
part, this reflects the difference between a pacted transition and a negotiated
settlement to civil war resulting in a political regime transition. Regarding the
latter, the situation in El Salvador demanded that the relationship between the
state, civil society and the armed forces be reconfigured. The presence of the
United Nations gave the Salvadoran Commission additional politicalleverage to
address these issues.63 It made sweeping recommendations for demilitarising
society according to the terms of the Peace Accords. The report was particularly
concerned with consolidating the supremacy of civilian authority and
subordinating the armed forces to democratic institutions and process.
Accordingly, the Salvadoran Commission based its recommendations on
four principles; "democracy, which leaves the fundamental decisions as to the
destiny of the country in the hands of the people and gives priority to dialogue
and negotiation as basic political tools; Participation, which integrates minorities
with majority ...; The rule of law, in which the primacy of respect of and for the
law is the basis of a culture which guarantees equality ...; Respect for human
rights, which are the raison detre of the above four principles and serves as the
basis of a society organized to serve people, all of whom are vested with equal
freedom and dignity" (1993: 174).
Restrained by the power of the armed forces and the absence of
international forcescapable of acting as a balance, the Chilean Commission was
not able to present recommendations reformulating the relationship between the
state and the different sectors of society. For example, while proposing some
judicial reforms, the Commission did not recommend a complete overhaul of the
civilian and military judicial systems as occurred in El Salvador. Regarding civil-
military relations, they "could only call for a commitment from the armed forces
to respect human rights in the performance of their duties" (Ensalaco, 1994:
668).
Reflecting the investigation's objective of resolving serious violations
suffered by individuals, the Chilean Commission recommended a comprehensive .
system of reparations such as a pension and improved access to social services
(education and health) for the immediate families of the victims (Rettig, 1993:
843-849). Its Salvadoran counterpart offered only limited financial and "moral"
compensation to be funded by both the state and the international community.
The details of the Salvadoran reparations were vague and subject to the limits of
the country's "prevailing economic situation" (1993: 186-187). The Chilean
Commission also proposed measures to "solemniy" restore the good name of the
victims (Rettig, 1993: 839). Regarding national reconciliation, the Commission
63 Popkin and Roht-Arriaza note that "UN pressure is effective as it is back ed by the promise of
foreign aid and the threat of withholding it" (1995: 104).
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proposed such measures as the declaration of a National Human Rights Day and
the creation of public parks honoring the memory of all of the dead (ibid: 839).
The measures were symbolic, a recognition that all sectors of society had suffered
in one form or another during the violence.
Despite important differences arising from the dissimilar contexts, there
are several points of convergence in the two sets of recommendations. First, both
Commissions approached the issue of dismantling authoritarian enclaves of an
institutional character through the normative basis of international human rights
instruments and international humanitarian law. At a minimum, these structural
changes were intended to harmonise national regimes with the obligations of the
respective countries under international instruments to which they were a State
Party. In this manner, the Truth Commissions for El Salvador and Chile acted as
a mechanism to transfer international norms into the national polity.
Second, there were numerous points of convergence in the two sets of
recommendations. A summary of the se points includes the following:
Table 11: Common recommendations
It must be added that the mandate of both Truth Commissions was limited to the
act of making the recommendations. The Commissions were not implementing
. bodies and their recommendations were passed on to the appropriate government
body for action. A measure of the long term effectiveness of a Truth Commission,
therefore, is the degree to which its recommendations are accepted and
implemented by the inaugural regime. In turn, implementation depends on the
political wil and powercapabilities of the inaugural regimes and the resources
available to them.
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4.3 Truth Commissions and transition in the realm of
social epistemes
Transition in the realm of social epistemes speaks to changes in the bodies of
ideas and ways of imagining social relations that shape a political collectivity.
While the epistemic foundations of the former regimes in Chile and El Salvador
were based on the Doctrine of National Security and the culture of fear that the
Doctrine produced, transition demanded the evolution of values and belief
systems that supported the consolidation of a democratic polit y; that the culture
of fear be replaced with a culture of human rights and tolerance.
At the heart of epistemic change was the evolution of new ways of
"imagining" relations between power and its subjects, between the state and civil
society and between the different sectors of society that were formerly in conflict.
At all three of these leveis, Garretón argues that dismantling the culture of fear
required finding a resolution to the mutual threat and insecurity felt by both
those in power and the groups in society that were the subjects of repression
(1992: 14-16). It was necessary, therefore, to liberate both the victors and the
losers of past conflicts from their fears, allowing them to submit their interests to
the democratic process and to engage in a tolerant civil discourse.
All four goals of a Truth Commission have the potential to contribute
toward the creation of new epistemic foundations for societies in transition. For
example, changes occurring within the realm of Strategic Behaviour can create
"appropriate orders of rule and exchange" within the polit Y (Ruggie, 1993: 157).
When gross and systematic violations are committed with impunity, social actors
are unable "to predict the consequences of their behaviour because public
authority is arbitrarily and brutally exercised" (Coradi, 1992: 4). However, clear
orders in the new democratic polit Y provide a sense of security by removing
arbitrary action from the repertoire of possible responses to dissenting voices.
Social actors, therefore, are able to engage in the political discourse without the
fear of become the target of violent repression.
Of more direct relevance to epistemic change, Truth Commissions can
legitimise the culture, beliefs and values associated with human rights as the new
framework for imagining social relations. Rights are the antithesis of arbitrary
power and fear. Where effective, they guarantee the due process of law, the right
to participate in the political life of the country, to dissent without fear of
physical retribution and they broaden the concept of the "national security" to
include the well-being of all persons in society. The manner in which relations of
power in society are imagined, therefore, is reconfigured accordingly.
Truth Commissions also have the potential to transform the epistemic
foundations of society through truth telling; the act of investigating human rights
violations and producing an authoritative record of the past. Both the Salvadoran
and Chilean Commissions were based on the premise that creating a version of
the past that was commonly held in society was a first step towards reconciliation
in society. They concluded that:
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Table 12: Truth telling
Popkin and Roht-Arriaza write that "an authoritative description and analysis
prepared by respected national figures from across the political spectrum or well
known foreign dignitaries will eventually be widely accepted and form the basis
of the historical record" (1995: 114). Creating a credible version of past events is
particularly important in polarised societies where interpretations of history are
contested and potentially form the basis for future conflicts. In this context,
"presentation of a full and unbiased record (is) important both to counter the
deceptions of and justifications of the military and to move fairly recent and stil
potent events into the more distant category of 'history' , establishing a line
between the past and the present" (ibid: 93).
Hayner makes a similar argument in writing that the importance of a
Commission's report is in "acknowledging the truth rather than finding it"
(1994: 607). She describes the report, therefore, as an "acknowledged truth" that
is particularly important where the state has formerly denied either that the
violations occurred or the extent to which its agents were responsible. Quoting
Mendez, Hayner notes that "knowledge that is officially sanctioned, and thereby
made part of the public cognitive scene ... acquires a mysterious quality that is
not there when it is merely the truth" (as quoted in Hayner, 1994: 607). In El
Salvador, Buergenthal concludes that the impact of creating an acknowledged
truth was to "strip away the any veneer of legitimacy which the former regime
may have enjoyed" (1995: 321). With this information available in the public
realm, it was possible to challenge the Doctrine of National Security by exposing
the extent and illegal nature of the actions of former regimes.
Hayner also stresses the psychological importance of recognising a "truth"
which was previously denied. She argues that the act can have the "cathartic
effect" of bringing a form of closure to the past (ibid: 608). Preserving memory,
therefore, can "be part of the formula for lasting peace" (Mendez, 1997: 257).
The themes of closure and reconciliation through truth telling were
particularly relevant to the Chilean Commission's report. Commission members
stressed that "national unit y" and the ability to reconcile socÜil polarisation
depended, in large part, on developing a shared historical memo ry (Zalaquett,
1993: xxxii). They argued that "we must collectively acknowledge that all of this
happened. Only from that moment on ... will some be moved to repentance and
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others to forgiveness" (892). Similarly, Buergenthal writes that the release of the
Salvadoran Commission's report had a significant psychological impact on the
people of El Salvador. "The report told the truth in a country not used to hearing
it ... The findings confirmed what many suspected, some knew and others refused
to believe ... (however) few Salvadorans knew the whole story and many more
could not separate the truth from the lies" (1995: 321). He argues that the report
put an end to the counter-charges between former combatants and their allies,
allowing the country to focus on the future rather than the past.
The process of acknowledging extends to the inaugural regime itself. In
convening a Commission, the Chilean and Salvadoran states admitted the fact
that past human rights violations occurred and that their agents held some degree
of responsibility. The states also publicly admitted their complicity with the
violence, recognised that these acts were wrong and that the state had an
obligation to provide some form of resolution for their legacy. By officially
declaring that past actions were wrong, the Commissions set a new moral
standard against which the future actions of state can be judged.
However, for the process of acknowledging to be complete, the state must
go beyond simply mandating a Commission to publicly accepting its report as an
official version of what happened. Chile's President Aylwin took this action,
presenting the fin dings of the Commission in a televised national address. As the
head of state, Aylwin accepted the accuracy of the report and apologised for the
crimes committed by its agents. The report was the n widely disseminated and
commended by a unanimous resolution of Congress. However, the military under
General Pinochet publicly rejected the report. It did not dispute the individual
findings of what happened, rather the military focused "mostly on the historical
interpretation of the Allende administration and the role of the military
government (Zalaquett, 1993: xxxii).
Unlike its Chilean counterpart, the Salvadoran government has never
accepted the report of the Truth Commission as its own. Rather, both the
government and the military publicly condemned the report as biased, politically
motivated and inaccurate. The Salvadoran government, therefore, does not yet
appear "to have gone through the intern al process required to come to terms with
the past" (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 1995: 101).
Beyond refusing to acknowledge past wrongs, authoritarian actors in both
countries sought to obstruct the Commissions' investigations. As one example,
neither the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Chile (Rettig, 1993: 2) nor
the Truth Commission for El Salvador had the legal authority to compel
testimony from witness. Both subsequently complained about the of lack of co-
operation from individuals and institutions alleged to have perpetrated past
violations. The Salvadoran Commissioners wrote that "one thing must be
squarely denounced: owing to the destruction or concealment of documents, or
the failure to divulge the locations where numerous persons were imprisoned or
bodies buried, the burden of proof frequently reverted to the Commission, the
judiciary and cItizens who found themselves forced to reconstruct events"
(Salvadoran Commission: 1993: 13). Commissioner Buergenthal alleges that the
Salvadoran military and government officials blocked access to important
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documentation and destroyed or hid evidence (1995: 298-299). Regarding the
testimony of officers that appeared before the Commission, Buergenthal
concluded that "for the most part, they lied" (ibid: 303).
The resistance of former authoritarian actors to an interpretation of
history that is critical of their actions is not surprising. However, it points to the
problems inherent in trying to promote reconciliation and national unit y on the
basis of a shared understanding of history. More precisely, the logic of a Truth
Commission presumes that it is possible to create such a history. Ignatieff argues
that "the truth that matters to people is not the factual or narrative truth, but
moral or interpretive truth" (1997: 2). The idea of "truth" , therefore, is closely
related to identity. What individuals or groups in society perceive to be true is
relative to who they understand themselves to be. Reflecting the sense of identity
and interests held by the military and their civilian allies, these groups were
hostile to the Commission process in both countries. This suggests that the best a
Commission can hope to do is isolate authoritarian actors in history by providing
a credible alternative version.
Another way Truth Commissions can contribute to the creation of new
epistemic foundations for society is through their second goal of "providing a
platform for the victims to tell their story" . Popkin and Roht-Arriaza conclude
that "a major success of the Commissions is their role in listening to, and
validating the stories and the human dignity of the victims. This suggests that it is
the process of compiling the Commissions' report, as much as the final product,
which is important" (1995: 114). The act of "telling their story" and validating
the experiences of victims is of ten referredto as the cathartic effect of a Truth
Commission process; the impact on the collective psyche of society when the
truth about past events is revealed. Some scholars argue that this forms the basis
on which a reconciliation between conflicting elements of society can occur
(Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 1995: 114; Hayner 1994: 600; Buergenthal, 1995:
321).
According to Salvadoran Commissioner Buergenthal, "many people who
came before the Commission to tell what happened to them or their relatives and
friends had not (publicly told their stories) before. For some, ten years or more
had gone by in silence and pent up anger. Finally, someone listened, and there
would be a record of what they endured" (1995: 321). Buergenthal notes that
many witnesses were more interested in "being heard" than in seeking retribution
against the persons responsible. After telling their stories, the witnesses could go
home and "focus on the future less unencumbered by the past" (ibid: 321).
Similar descriptions are made regarding the Chilean Commissions investigation
process (Zalaquett, 1993; Ensalaco, 1994).
Finally, the importance of epistemic transition was reflected in the
Commissions' recommendations. Both proposed measures to promote a culture
of human rights in the transitional society. The Chilean Commission's report
included a section entitled "Suggestions Aimed at Consolidating a Culture Truly
Respectful of Human Rights" (Rettig, 1993: 878). The report argued that legal
reforms are insufficient to guarantee that government officials and private citizens
will respect human rights. "Such an assurance can on ly be achieved in a society
57
C M I
whose culture is truly inspired by unrestricted acknowledgment of the essential
rights of human beings. Respect for such rights flows naturally out of such a
culture as a part of everyday life and is manifested throughout the whole range of
the nation's activities (ibid: 878). The report makes additional
recommendations to the education system and other national programmes and
institutions that would support the evolution of such a culture (ibid: 878-886).
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5 Conclusion
It is difficult to imagine a society moving from an authoritarian regime to a
functioning democratic polit Y without coming to terms with the painful events in
its recent past. These happenings are too fresh in the collective memory of society
to ignore without jeopardising the politicallegitimacy of the inaugural regime. A
failure to dismantle the structures that permitted human rights violations also
leaves authoritarian enclaves intact, allowing non-democratic actors to intrude in
areas of governance that should be under civil jurisdiction. More diffuse and
difficult to quantify but equally important, the way an inaugural regime deals
with pa st violations sets the tone and principles for future governance. Q'Donnell
and Schmitter write that when a society buries the past by "refusing to confront
and purge itself (it also) buries the very ethical values it needs to make the future
liveable" (1995: 59). Accounting for the past, therefore, is a necessary part of the
transition process, in the form of clarifying what happened, imposing some form
of judgement and sanction on the persons responsible for human rights violations
and establishing the rule of law.
Political transition is not an exact science. Based on Dahl's concept of
polyarchy, the literature offers definitions that identify some of the qualities
necessary to make a political system democratic. Particularly important are legal
regimes and institutional structures for the protection and promotion of human
rights that provide the minimum social and political guarantees for a democratic
polit Y to function. However, there is little precision reg 
ard ing how these qualities
combine to create a democracy or the process through which a nation must pass
to create and sustain them over time.
In the absence of a clear transition model, this paper has assessed the role
of Truth Commissions in supporting democratisation by placing them in the
larger "complex dialectic" of transition and identifying the sites of transition that
Commissions are. able to address. It makes three essential conclusions. First,
Truth Commissions can not resolve the state's legacy of past human rights
violations on their own accord. Commissions are a compromise mechanism used
in a situation of incomplete transition. As such, their mandates and the scope of
their agency are limited by the dynamics of power. Despite a Commission's
potential contribution to democratic consolidation, there is a danger that "truth"
wil be used as a substitute for further actions rather than one of many initiatives
designed to provide both a measure of justice and the institutional and political
changes required to resolve the state's legacy of political violence. Perhaps most
importantly, Truth Commissions can be used to take human rights violations out
of the sphere of judicial action, particularly where they are accompanied by an
amnesty law. It is important, therefore, to be clear regarding what Commissions
are capable of accomplishing and what is beyond the reach of their agency.
Second, despite their limitations Truth Commissions have a significant
potential to support the consolidation of a democratic polity. They contribute to
the two essential tasks of transition in the sites of Strategic Behaviour (the
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institutional matrix of constraints and opportunities) and Social Epistemes
(bodies of knowledge and ways of imagining relations within a political
collective). While the se changes may not be immediately related to the problem of
prosecution, their longer term impact on society can be just as significant as
criminal prosecutions. AIso, any change in the sites of Strategic Behaviour and
Social Epistemes has significant and positive implications for the entire polit Y as
transition in one area will have a ripple effect and influence other aspects of
governance in the emerging political system.
Third, Truth Commissions are not implementing bodies. Inaugural
regimes, therefore, must have the political will, power capabilities and the
resources necessary to follow up any process that a Truth Commission begins.
The regimes must also simultaneously enact initiatives in the sites of transition
that Commissions are not able to address. In turn, inaugural regimes must be
supported (or compelled) by the agency of an active cIvil society and, in some
cases, of the international community. For example, compliance with the
recommendations of a Truth Commission requires constant monitoring, not just
short term political pressure. Their agency is particularly important where the
regime may not be predisposed to change as in the case in El Salvador.
Based on these findings, two scenarios emerge related to the impact of
Truth Commission investigations in Latin American. In the first, Commissions
can establish an historical record and legal documentation that serves as the basis
for criminal prosecution at a later date when the balance of forces in society is
more favourable. Truth telling, therefore, serves as a step toward accountability.
A Commission can also provide the basis for institutional and social reforms,
including altering the dynamic of relations between the state and civil society. In
the second scenario, the persons responsible for pa st violations can use a
Commission process to respond to popular demands for an investigation while at
the same time avoiding formal criminal proceedings. "Truth" becomes a poor
alternative to "justice" that permits authoritarian actors to move into the future
with their power intact. It "allows exactly the kind of false reconciliation with the
past that (the Commission) was created to forestall" (Ignatieff, 1996) and is likely
"doomed to be forgotten by the society that it purported to serve" (Mendez,
1997: 269).
Trying to bury the past is of ten ethically unacceptable to the majority of
the population. Perceived injustice can remain alive in the collective conscience of
a society for centuries. Where unresolved, societies are doomed to repeatedly
fight the same battles. Transitional actors, therefore, must not only deal with
their vital interests as defined by the dynamics of power, but also with ideals of
what is perceived to be just. Faced with this challenge, Truth Commissions are an
inadequate solution that leave unresolved many of the dilemmas related to
resolving past human rightsviolations. Their limitations are not necessarily a
problem of the Commissions themselves, but reflect the transitional situations in
which they were conceived. However, despite their short comings, Commissions
can play a critical role in fostering a environment where meaningful change can
take place.
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Appendix *: Can truth bring reconciliation to
Guatemala?
Guatemala's 36- year civil warcame to an end in 1996 with the signing of a Peace
Accord between the Government and the United Revolutionary Front guerrilas.
Two years later, the fighting has stopped, but the memory of the conflict stiliingers.
Can a Truth Commission prornote reconciliation between Guatemalans?
"It was an earthquake that shook the whole country; now Guatemalans know the
truth about what happ ene d in their country." In this manner, Norway's Ambassador
to Guatemala, Arne Aasheim described the 3,600 page report of the Commission for
Historical Clarification, which was presented on 25 February 1999.
The Commission was created under the 1996 Peace Accords between the
Government and the United Revolutionary Front (URNG) guerrillas with a mandate
to investigate human rights violations committed during Guatemala's 36-year civil
war and to clarify why and how the violations happened. The conflict left over
200,000 persons dead, up to a million and a half persons displaced and an
uncounted number of victims of human rights violations such as torture.
The Commission's findings were devastating for the Guatemalan State; 93 percent of
the more than 42,000 cases of human rights violations that it documented were
attributed to Guatemalan security forces and paramilitary groups associated with
them. Only three percent of the violations were attributed to the URNG. The
Commission could not determine who was responsible for the remaining four
percent.
The CEH findings are supported by those of the Catholic Church's Project for the
Recovery of the Historical Memory (REMHI), which presente d its report in 1998.
Of the more than 50,000 cases investigated, the REMHI attributed responsibility for
90.53 percent to agents of the Guatemalan State or paramilitary groups associated
with them and 9.3 percent to the URNG.
Indigenous Mayans comprised 83 percent of the victims. The Commission found
pervasive evidence of "massive and indiscriminate violence systematically directed
against indigenous communities (by the Guatemalan State) independent of their
actual involvement with the (URNG) and with clear indifference to their status as
non-combatants". The evidence lea d the Commission to asurprise conclusion: that
the Guatemalan State committed acts of genocide in four regions of the country
between 1981 and 1983, with the intention of eliminating Mayan ethnic groups,
either by killing them or destroying their social cohesion.
Completed 1 October 1999.
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Genocide is defined by international law as "acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a nation, ethnic, racial or religious group." The
Commission found that the "only common denominator for all of the victims was
that they belonged to a specific ethnic group." The violence against the Mayans was
carefully planned by the highest levels of the Government and the military command
with the express purpose of "eliminating ethnically based groups, either by killing
them or destroying the basis of their culture and social cohesion."
The crowd miling around after the presentation of the Commission's report was
hushed; people from all sides of the conflict were stunned by the severity of its
findings. Since then, questions are emerging about the impact of the report for
Guatemala's Peace Process. To assess the possibilities, it is necessary to understand
its role and mandate.
A Truth Commission is not a judicial body with the power to prosecute the
individuals responsible for past human violations. The weakness of the
Commission's mandate reflected the dynamics of power in post-conflict Guatemala;
the military retained its strength and was not willing to subject its members to
criminal proceedings. According to one General, "we won the war, why should we
surrender the victory?" The new civilian government had neither the power nor the
will to challenge them.
However, during peace negotiations the military was forced to allow an investigation
into the past, offering "truth" as a substitute for "justice". This truth-but-not-justice
formula has been used in other countries, such as South Africa, El Salvador,
Argentina and Chile that have used Truth Commissions to support a transition to
democratic government after a period of conflict. What these countries have in
common with Guatemala is a situation of incomplete transition that left enclaves of
authoritarian power inside of the fledgling democratic system.
Rather that the prosecution of individuals, the Commission hada broa der social
purpose; to create an "accurate and unbiased account" of Guatemala's history
acknowledged as fact by all of the Parties to the conflict. The Commissioners
claimed that creating this record was a first step toward reconciliation between the
former combatants and between the victims and the perpetrators of human rights
violations. Truth ensures "that those affected by the armed conflict are listene d to ...
and no longer considered as victims, but as protagonists in the country's future."
According to Commissioner Christian Tomuschat, "acknowledging responsibility
also allows the perpetrators (of violations) to recover their human dignity, which
was lost as a consequence of their actions."
The bible says that the process of reconciliation has two steps. The persons
responsible for past human rights violations must acknowledge their actions, accept
responsibility and ask the victims for forgiveness. The victims must then be wiling to
grant that forgiveness. None of these steps seems possible in Guatemala. The
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Government of President Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen refused to apologise for past human
rights violations. Instead, his government launched what one former senior
Commission sta ff persons described as a "concerted campaign to discredit,
undermine and play down the importance of the (Commission's) report." President
Arzú told the international press in August 1999 that he does not believe, within the
legal definition, that acts of genocide were committed.
The Government also refused to accept the report as an "official" version of
Guatemala's history, instead calling it only one interpretation of a "complex and
controversial situation." The symbolism of this position is important; by definition
the Government gives equal weight to other versions of history and rejects the report
as the basis for reconstructing Guatemala's historical memory.
Leading candidates in the 1999 election campaign have also refused to make
compliance with the Commission's recommendations an issue. The FRG's Alfonso
Portilo, who has close links with the military, explained his unwilingness to debate
the report by saying "I prefer to focus on the future, not the past." The PAN's Vice-
presidential candidate Arabella Castro stated that compliance "with
recommendations such as exhuming bodies from clandestine graves and search for
the disappeared will only open old wounds. As well, many of the families of the
victims have said that they don't want their loved ones to be exhumed." Her
statement is in direct contradiction to those of many victims' families.
For its part, the Guatemalan military obstructed the investigation. The extent of their
deception was shown with the recent discovery of a 1984 army logbook that
carefully records the fate 183 persons, 100 of whom were executed. According to
Commissioner, Otilia Lux de Coti, who now lives in Norway, "we asked (the
military) for reports on specific cases of people who had disappeared or were kiled
... and were told that such documents did not exist. This shows us that they did not
tell the truth."
Nor do other protagonists to the conflict appear ready to accept their responsibility.
Efrín Rios Montt, President of Guatemala in 1982-83 when the genocide to ok place,
said he had no knowledge of the killing, stating "my conscience is clean and I sleep
well at night." On the other side, Nobellaureate, Rigoberta Menchú, stated "I am
not sure that I can ever forgive (the military)." Only the URNG has declared "with
profound pain and humbleness we ask forgiveness from the victims, their families
and communities for any kind of excesses."
The rationale that truth-telling leads to reconciliation is a noble concept, but it may
not yet apply to Guatemala. The argument assumes that it is possible to have one
shared truth about what happened; that a nation can have one mind about the past;
that truth is certain, not contestable and that when all is exposed, human beings
have the capacity to ask for pardon or forgive. However, truth is relative to identity.
People do not readily surrender the ideals on which they have based their entire lives.
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Reconciliation, therefore may be something left to the next generation of
Guatemalans.
So what is the impact of the Commission's report? Most importantly, it broke the
silence. The State formerly used terror "to intimidate and silence (Guatemalan)
society as a whole." Everyone knew what was happening, but few had the courage
to speak up because they ran the risk of being killed. What was a public secret is
now public knowledge; the subject of unafraid conversation. Each repetition of the
facts has the power to embolden the formerly silenced majority. If nothing else, the
report reduces the number of li es in circulation. According to one Guatemalan
commentator, "the false versions of version of history told to us by the military has
been put in their place; the cemetery of lies."
The report also redefines the values that shape relationships throughout Guatemalan
society, replacing the old values associated with repression and dictatorship with
new on es that speak to respect for human rights, the sanctity of human life and
democratic participation. The report strips away the legitimacy of those on both
sides who committed human rights violations, clearly stating that they acted
"without respect for the rule of law or fundamental ethical or religious values."
These are important steps in any process of democratic transition.
One immediate impact is that all three major parties in the 1999 election are being
forced to explain the background of candidates alleged to have committed human
rights violations. Several have been expelled from the P AN and FRG roster.
Finally, the Commission overcame its weak truth-instead-of-justice mandate by
laying the foundation for future criminal prosecution. The Guatemalan Congress
passed an act in 1996 granting immunity to those who fought during the war.
However, the act does not cover crimes against humanity. The Commission's
surprise conclusion that the State committed acts of genocide, therefore, leaves many
former and present members of the military and the URNG open to criminal
prosecution.
Whether prosecutions take place depends on reforms to make Guatemalan's judicial
system more effective. However, the case pending against Chile's General Augusto
Pinochet, who is held in London for human rights violations committed during his
IS-year rule, and the International War Crimes Tribunal indictment against
Yugoslav President Milosovic raise hopes for criminal action at the international
leve L. As a result, high profile military actors such as Rios Montt are known to have
cancelled international travel to countries where they might be detained, and
national and international human rights groups are organising legal proceedings.
The truth, or a close approximation of it, is now in the hands of Guatemalan society.
How that information is used depends on the courage of Guatemalans to confront
their past. Nothing is guaranteed; there are still strong groups that oppose the Peace
process. However, one lesson is clear for all to see; the destructiveness of armed
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conflict and the equality of the victims from all sides in death. Perhaps this is the one
"truth" that will allow Guatemalans to move into the future.
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